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Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique
Digital Property
JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD*
Markets for unique digital property—digital equivalents of rare artworks, collectible
trading cards, and other assets that gain value from scarcity—have exploded in the
past few years. At root is the next iteration of blockchain technology, unique digital
assets called non-fungible tokens. Unlike bitcoin, where one coin is the same as
another, NFTs are unique, each with different attributes. An NFT that represented
ownership of Boardwalk would be quite different from one that represented Baltic
Avenue.
NFTs have grown from a few early breakout successes to a rapidly developing
market for unique digital treasures. The attraction to buyers is that, unlike digital
assets like e-books or licensed movies, NFTs can be bought, sold, displayed, gifted,
or even destroyed just like personal property. Yet law has not kept pace with demand
for unique digital property. In particular, the rules designed for the 2000s internet
focused on expanding intellectual property licenses and online contracts to the point
that consumers are mere users, not owners, of digital assets. This “end of
ownership” legal structure stands in stark contrast to the expectations of those who
create, buy, sell, and invest in NFTs.
This article proposes a clear path for the evolution of the legal underpinnings of
NFTs. It argues that NFTs are personal property, not contracts (despite the “smart
contracts” popular nomenclature) or pure intellectual property licenses (despite the
currently governing law of digital assets like e-books). Because transactions in NFTs
are in the form of a sale, the law of sales of personal property should apply. And
finally, the article notes that NFTs will serve as a powerful, grounding example of
digital personal property, a legal form of ownership that is both sorely needed and
has not yet been clearly established online. That example will ground others, and
permit law to again characterize those who buy scarce and valuable digital assets
as true owners rather than mere users.

* Joshua A.T. Fairfield, William D. Bain Family Professor of Law, W&L University
School of Law. Thanks go to Aaron Wright, Gus Hurwitz, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Aaron
Perzanowski, Leandra Lederman, Chris Seaman, Juliet Moringiello, Chris Odinet, and all of
the participants in the Law and Technology Workshop Series. Thanks to the Frances Lewis
Law Center for funding in support of this scholarship, and thanks to Nate Reynolds and John
Coffron for research support.

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 179

6/15/22 12:58 PM

1262

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1261

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1262
I. CREATING DIGITAL UNIQUENESS ..................................................................... 1268
A. EVOLVING BLOCKCHAIN AND NFT TECHNOLOGY ................................ 1268
B. NFT EXAMPLES ..................................................................................... 1273
C. TECHNICAL CLAWBACKS OF DIGITAL RIGHTS ....................................... 1278
D. NFT TAXONOMY ................................................................................... 1282
II. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEMS .............................................. 1284
A. THE LEGAL LITERATURE ....................................................................... 1286
1. THE SMART CONTRACT FALLACY ................................................. 1286
2. THE NASCENT NFT LITERATURE .................................................. 1287
B. SORTING PROPERTY AND CONTRACT ..................................................... 1290
C. NFTS FACE A HOSTILE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LANDSCAPE ............ 1294
III. A STABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL UNIQUENESS .......................... 1299
A. PICKING ROBUST LEGAL ANALOGIES .................................................... 1300
1. SALES OF NFTS ............................................................................. 1300
2. CLARIFYING CONTRACT’S ROLE ................................................... 1301
3. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES................... 1302
4. SALES VERSUS LICENSE CHARACTERIZATIONS............................. 1304
5. THE BATTLE OF THE ALGORITHMS. ............................................... 1306
B. THE NEED FOR STRONG PERSONAL PROPERTY ANALOGIES .................. 1308
C. GROUNDING EXAMPLES ......................................................................... 1310
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 1312
“We have tons of digital stuff, we’ve just never really owned it.”
—The NFT Bible1
INTRODUCTION
Rare and unique items used to be limited to physical space. People buy and trade
baseball cards, rare coins, and stamps. The next generation of blockchain technology
is now taking scarcity and uniqueness online, making ownership of truly unique
digital artifacts possible. In August 2020, a one-of-a-kind Mike Trout baseball card
sold for $3,936,000, eclipsing the previous 2016 record for the sale of a 1909 Honus
Wagner T-206 card for $3.12 million.2 On November 21, 2020, a digital pet named
Axia, based on the Pokémon concept, rage-tweeted that its sale price was $97,000.3
In 2018, a unique digital pet named Dragon sold on the Ethereum blockchain for
$170,000.4 Just like the trading cards, Axia and Dragon are rare, even unique. The

1. Devin Finzer, The Non‑Fungible Token Bible: Everything You Need to Know About
NFTs, OPENSEA (Jan. 10, 2020), https://blog.opensea.io/guides/non-fungible-tokens/
[https://perma.cc/BPX5-K7J4].
2. Tom VanHaaren, Mike Trout Rookie Card Becomes Highest‑Selling Sports Card of
All Time, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/29723239/mike-troutrookie-card-becomes-highest-selling-sports-card-all [https://perma.cc/Q899-H8PJ].
3. @axie265, TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2020, 10:11 PM), https://twitter.com/axie265/
status/1330348183638183936 [https://perma.cc/RS8V-WTHX].
4. Chuong Nguyen, Cat Got Your Wallet? CryptoKitties Virtual Feline Fetches $170K
in Crypto Cash, DIGITALTRENDS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/
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difference between the digital pets and the card is that the card exists in real space
while the pets exist in virtual space. All still derive value from their scarcity.
People are buying digital assets at confoundingly high rates as more entities begin
to buy into the concept of non-fungible tokens, or NFTs. The MLB and NBA both
curate digital collectible marketplaces backed by distributed ledger technology. MLB
runs MLB Champions where users can buy baseball player bobbleheads and use
them in a game.5 The NBA runs NBA Top Shot which allows users to buy
“Moments” of great plays that have been stored in tradable virtual cubes.6 Sales from
Top Shot surpassed $700 million in less than a year.7 The market for NFT collectibles
and art grew 115% in December 2020 alone.8 In 2021, the sales of NFTs reached $25
billion.9 A single NFT artwork sold for $69.3 million at a Christie’s sale in March
2021, setting a new record in the community.10 In 2021 and 2022, NFT sales from
the Bored Ape Yacht Club, a single NFT art seller, totaled more than $1 billion as
celebrities started to buy the apes.11 The NFT market has gone vertical, and it is time
to examine the legal underpinnings of the exploding trade in digital personal
property.
What makes these assets valuable is that they are one-of-a-kind. Offline, we take
the properties of rivalrousness and uniqueness for granted. Rivalrousness is the idea
that if I have a thing, you don’t.12 If I give it to you, you have it, and I don’t.
Uniqueness is a related and extended version of rivalrousness. If I have a unique
object, there is no replacement for it. Individual baseballs may be rivalrous with each

dragon-cryptokitties-most-expensive-virtual-cat/ [https://perma.cc/8KWH-FRUR].
5. See Frequently Asked Questions, MLB CHAMPIONS, https://www.mlbc.app/faq
[https://perma.cc/BL2A-Q4DB].
6. See Dapper Labs, Inc., Dapper Labs Opens NBA Top Shot Beta to All Fans, PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2020, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dapper-labs-opensnba-top-shot-beta-to-all-fans-301144010.html [https://perma.cc/L9XN-MVS2].
7. Danny Nelson, Dapper Labs’ NBA Top Shot Has Crossed the Million-User Mark,
COINDESK (Sept. 14, 2021, 9:01 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/05/25/
dapper-labs-nba-top-shot-has-crossed-the-million-user-mark/
[https://perma.cc/RLZ2RJHE].
8. See Harrison Seletsky & Ryan Smith, NFT Market Takes Off with 115% Month Over
Month Growth, BEINCRYPTO (Dec. 17, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://beincrypto.com/nft-markettakes-off-with-115-month-over-month-growth/ [https://perma.cc/8X5S-5B4R] (describing
exceptional growth and record-breaking sales for NFTs).
9. Elizabeth Howcroft, NFT Sale Hit $25 Billion in 2021, but Growth Shows Signs of
Slowing, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2021, 10:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/nftsales-hit-25-billion-2021-growth-shows-signs-slowing-2022-01-10/ [https://perma.cc/RA79HJWL] (reporting NFT growth through 2021 and cataloging record NFT sales).
10. Id.
11. Isabelle Lee, Sales of Bored Ape Yacht Club NFTs Jump Past $1 Billion amid
Heightened Interest from Celebrity Collectors, INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2022, 11:56 AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/bored-ape-yacht-club-nft-sales-1billion-opensea-bayc-2022-1 [https://perma.cc/D6GA-3Z3N] (reporting sales of Bored Ape
Yacht Club NFTs have surpassed $1 billion).
12. See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM 148 (2017) [hereinafter FAIRFIELD, OWNED] (“Rivalrousness means that if I have a
thing, you don’t.”).
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other, but not unique. A baseball signed by Mike Trout would be unique and rivalrous
if it is the only baseball he ever signed.
Humans value uniqueness and scarcity both economically and sentimentally.
Economically, the scarcer an item is, the more we are willing to pay for it.13 For
example, an Action Comics No. 1 sold in 2014 for over three million dollars.14 If
everyone had a copy of that few pieces of stapled-together paper, the value would be
nothing. Sentimentally, people attach value to unique objects based on that object’s
personal history.15 A golden ring, once one of many in a store, becomes a symbol of
a marriage. Those things become unique to us, non-fungible, not like the others. It is
important to know which object is which. What spouse would not be devastated if
their wedding ring were thrown into a box of identical rings, and they were told to
pick one out?
People value and surround themselves with objects to which they attach their lives
and experiences. Keychains and tee shirts memorialize family vacations. Mint
condition vinyl records represent years of memories and collecting. Humans innately
seek to store value from their life in these objects. Consistent with the digital shift,
the way we do that has changed dramatically.16 As an example: ask someone in two
different decades what they would save from their house if it were burning down. In
the 1950s someone might say a photo album. In the 2020s, someone is much more
likely to say their phone or laptop. All the sentimental and personal value that people
used to store in the objects around them is now stored inside of digital devices or in
the cloud. Photo albums become photo apps. Letter exchanges become text
messages.
While this digital shift has been building for some time, the rivalrousness and
uniqueness that gives value to items in physical space has been hard to reproduce
online. Every image online can be copied by right-clicking on it and saving the file.
Every file sent is sent by making a copy. The kind of value we attach to our unique
homes, works of art, collectible trading cards, and even personal data has gone
entirely unrealized in a digital environment where copying is the breath of
connectivity. Although it is clear that people become deeply attached to digital
assets—an avatar in a massively multiplayer online game, an island in Animal

13. See id. at 149 (explaining by way of example that Martin Shkreli gladly purchased the
Wu‑Tang Clan’s album, Once Upon a Time in Shaolin, for the exorbitant price of $2 million
precisely because the Wu‑Tang Clan made the album a scarce resource by only auctioning off
a single copy of the album).
14. Angela Watercutter, World’s Most Expensive Superman Comic Just Sold for $3.2M
on eBay, WIRED (Aug. 25, 2014, 3:46 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/supermancomic-3-million-ebay/ [https://perma.cc/J8GA-5KNS].
15. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 961
(1982) (“It intuitively appears that there is such a thing as property for personhood because
people become bound up with ‘things.’”).
16. See United States v. Petix, No. 15‑CR‑227A, 2016 WL 7017919, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2016) (“Like marbles, Beanie Babies™, or Pokémon™ trading cards, bitcoins have
value exclusively to the extent that people at any given time choose privately to assign them
value.”); FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 86 (noting that in this day and age, “it is entirely
possible to build relationships and meaningful attachments to fully digital spaces and
experiences”).
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Crossing, or the Facebook page of a deceased relative—technology and law have
failed to develop systems for creating unique digital assets. That is now changing.
Decentralized cryptoledgers—public, hack-resistant, decentralized lists of who
owns what—provided the first step. The result was cryptocurrencies like bitcoin,
which provided rivalrousness but not yet uniqueness.17 If I own a bitcoin, you do not,
and if I transfer it to you, I do not have access to it anymore. That is rivalrousness.
But uniqueness was harder to come by. Each bitcoin is worth the same as any other
bitcoin. It has, by and large, the same attributes as any other bitcoin. And there is
nothing to emotionally attach to in a bitcoin, no difference in characteristics and
meaning. Bitcoins are by and large the same. They are fungible.18
The creation of non-fungible—unique—digital assets is now on the edge of
mainstream technological implementation. Imagine a digital game in which the
players own rather than license the unique items they earn while playing the game.19
Imagine a database for deeds to land that would permit anyone to transmit land
ownership to anyone else with the bump of a smartphone.20 Imagine a virtual baseball
trading card game in which digital cards were truly unique and collectible, rather
than infinitely duplicatable with an online copy and paste.21 Consider the possibility
of a truly unique digital artwork, owned by a single person, displayed in a virtual
reality museum, and capable of being sold to another owner to realize the increase in
value stemming from its rarity and beauty.22 Such a world is imagined in fictional

17. See Shahla Hazratjee, Bitcoin: The Trade of Digital Signatures, 41 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 55, 61–63 (2015) (detailing how Bitcoin is a “system whereby Coins are securely passed
from one person to another” ultimately providing the current “holder of the Coin exclusive
right to ownership of the Coin”).
18. See Finzer, supra note 1 (describing how currency is a type of fungible asset because
it is inherently interchangeable and replaceable with other currency).
19. See, e.g., What Does True Ownership Mean? Don’t I Own Items in Other Games?,
GODS UNCHAINED, https://support.godsunchained.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500006242742What-does-true-ownership-mean-Don-t-I-own-items-in-other-games[https://perma.cc/
62ES-G8UJ] (“[W]e’re changing this old practice to give players real ownership over the items
they purchase or earn in games. This gives you the right to sell an item for ETH, use it in Gods
Unchained or even take it into a different game.”).
20. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 874 (2015)
[hereinafter Fairfield, BitProperty] (advocating for the use of blockchain technologies as the
foundation for digital and online ledgers to maintain “digital property, currency, county land
records, mortgage interests, security interests, stock ownership, and much more”); Bitcoin
Exchange News Team, BitProperty – BTP ICO Revenue Generating Real Estate Platform?,
BITCOINEXCHANGEGUIDE (Sept. 4, 2017), https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/bitproperty/
[https://perma.cc/ASA4-JRAL] (identifying Bitproperty as a digital blockchain based
marketplace which facilitates the online purchase and exchange of real estate investment
trusts).
21. See MLBCHAMPIONS, https://www.mlbcryptobaseball.com [https://perma.cc/4MXQGS3P] [hereinafter MLBCHAMPIONS Homepage] (stating that MLB Champions, or MLB
Crypto Baseball, is a blockchain based sports game that allows users to play with their very
own crypto figures).
22. See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPERRARE, https://superrare.com/about
[https://perma.cc/L328-KRF8] (writing that SuperRare is an online marketplace to collect and
trade unique single editions of digitally created artwork).
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works like Ready Player One in which characters own such items as the “Orb of
Osuvox” and use them to compete in a contest for the control of a virtual world.23 As
is often the case, science is doing the hard work of turning science fiction into reality.
This Article discusses the emerging law and technology of non-fungible tokens:
a way of creating unique digital assets that can be bought and sold like real-world
objects. NFTs are not like previous cryptocurrencies, where one coin is much the
same as another. Non-fungible tokens can be used to create digital artwork that can
be bought, sold, and owned like a physical sculpture, or a database of real estate in
which ownership is managed by electronic deeds that can be passed from one person
to another with low or no transaction costs. Digital item sales called
microtransactions already drive the videogame economy, from the sale of hats in
games like Team Fortress or Among Us to the purchase of special vehicles, weapons,
and armor in first-person shooters or massively multiplayer virtual worlds.24
Permitting gamers to truly own and resell what they buy or earn from the game
creates a new incentive structure for hardcore players, who may be able to earn a
living playing their favorite game.25
NFTs are rapidly becoming mainstream, and the demand for the technology
stands in stark contrast to the legal regime that governs them. Our rules were intended
for an older digital economy focused on licenses rather than sales of digital goods.
The struggle of NFTs to find a legal climate conducive to what they offer—full, real,
digital ownership—reflects a deeper struggle to shift our legal framework to handle
new technological possibilities.26 In particular, the past twenty years have given birth
to an unprecedented expansion of intellectual property rights, which companies
leverage into control over personal property owners. Ask owners of a new Oculus
Quest headset: if they buy games on the headset and ever delete their Facebook
account (or even if the Facebook algorithm finds they are insufficiently “active” on
their account), they forever lose games fully bought and paid for.27 That expansion
of intellectual property rights was accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of

23. See ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE 309 (2011).
24. See Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography, and Copyright, 47 AIPLA Q.J.
219, 220–21 (2019) (“Presently, for example, if a user crafts a digital sword in the popular
video game MineCraft or a creative skin in Fortnite, she cannot transfer that digital good into
another platform, at least not without the platform’s acquiescence based on its contractual
terms of use and licensing structure.”).
25. See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE WORLDS 125
(2010) (“And because property is more meaningful and valuable to its owners when it can be
gifted, sold, and traded, virtual worlds owners have incentives to create virtual economies to
please users, allowing them to use property to create and sustain social bonds.”).
26. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 208 (noting that the deficiencies which have
and continue to plague the legal framework governing digital and smart property rights has
led to an environment under which “we are in serious danger of being treated as digital tenants
on our own software enhanced devices”).
27. See Gabe Gurwin, Don’t Delete Facebook or You’ll Lose All Oculus Games for Good,
GAMESPOT (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:53 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/dont-deletefacebook-or-youll-lose-all-oculus-games-for-good/1100-6483716/ [https://perma.cc/E8CWXTR8] (“You’re required to link a Facebook account when using the Oculus Quest 2 headset,
and if your Facebook account isn’t in good standing, you will not be able to use the Quest 2 at
all.”).
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circumstances in which a court finds a minor, meaningless, technical act (such as
surfing to a website) to constitute grounds for having accepted a contract, usually
one in which a consumer cedes their rights by agreeing to arbitration.28 The
expansion of intellectual property rights online helped tame rampant piracy early in
the internet’s development, but it now offers an inadequate foundation as NFTs and
digital uniqueness enter the scene.29
Given the rapidly expanding importance of NFTs, lawyers must develop a stable
way of characterizing and protecting these interests. This piece aims to lay bare the
foundational problems in the legal regime surrounding NFTs, with the goal of
permitting the technology (and its adopters) to benefit from strong and simple
personal property interests when they buy or sell NFTs. The remainder of this Article
proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the technology, market logic, and
applications of NFTs, as well as some technical difficulties the technology faces in
delivering true digital ownership. Part II examines the existing legal literature and
law that courts will most likely apply to disputes between buyers and sellers of NFTs.
Without a developed characterization of NFTs as digital personal property, NFT
vendors using intellectual property licenses will be able to claw back key rights from
NFT purchasers, just as, for example, Amazon Kindle denies that Kindle e-book
purchasers truly own their purchases.30 In response, Part III proposes an alternative
and more natural characterization for the law of buying and selling NFTs. NFTs are
billed as personal property, and the central transactional form for NFTs is a sale.
Thus, this Article argues that the law of sales of personal property—Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code—offers powerful and flexible statutes for the formation,
enforcement, and remedies for NFT sales, a deep field of case law that can help some
sorts of thorny issues facing NFT markets, and analogies that courts can draw on to
resolve emerging questions of the proper legal characterization of the technology.
Part IV concludes.

28. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1128–29 (2000) (defining a click‑wrap agreement as a contract which is formed
after an internet user clicks “I agree” or proceeds to the site when presented with a website’s
terms and conditions of use); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“Contracts formed on the Internet come primarily in two flavors: ‘clickwrap’ (or
‘click‑through’) agreements, in which website users are required to click on an ‘I agree’ box
after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use; and ‘browsewrap’ agreements,
where a website’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the website via
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”).
29. See Bryan Wilson, Blockchain and the Law of the Cat: What Cryptokitties Might
Teach, 88 UMKC L. REV. 365, 369 (2019) (presenting how CryptoKitties, as one of the first
blockchain based games, demonstrated how progress under the third generation of the World
Wide Web, or Web 3.0 “will be won through, not just smarts, but also through creativity and
design”).
30. Joel Johnson, You Don’t Own Your Kindle Books, Amazon Reminds Customer, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012, 10:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/you-dont-own-yourkindle-books-amazon-reminds-customer-1C6626211 [https://perma.cc/GG57-F2PA]; see
also Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html
[https://
perma.cc/H7LX-P92S].
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I. CREATING DIGITAL UNIQUENESS
At the beginning of the internet, there was no way to sell digital assets without
risking rampant copying.31 Courts vastly expanded copyright law and liability in
response.32 Now, the technology to create unique digital assets exists, but the legal
framework has already strayed far in the direction of governing all such transactions
through overreaching copyright law.33 To return digital markets in personal property
to balance will require an understanding of both the technology and its surrounding
legal context. This Section describes the technology underlying NFTs, several of the
leading applications, and some of the problems that stand in the way of the promise
of the technology.
At its core, the problem is simple: offline, the transaction of selling an object to
someone else is so unremarkable that we often do not consider the significant amount
of law that goes into determining who can do what with assets that they purchase and
own. We only begin to understand the law underlying personal property ownership
when it fades—when we realize that online, we do not own the things we have bought
and fully paid for from Google, Apple, or Amazon. The entire project of NFTs is a
technological attempt to recreate a simple sales transaction, but for a unique digital
asset instead of a physical object. To do so, it is necessary first to understand how
NFTs work and why they differ from first-generation cryptocurrencies, and second
to understand some of the ways in which NFTs must change in order to offer the kind
of untrammeled personal property interest in digital assets that developers and sellers
promise.
A. Evolving Blockchain and NFT Technology
Scholars have written on the technology of blockchain and distributed public
ledgers at some length.34 Rather than repeat that scholarship here, I will establish the

31. See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
that the widespread copying of music on Napster had an adverse effect on the market for
music). In particular, Digital Rights Management (DRM) failed. DRM schemes were hacked
as quickly as they were produced.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (ruling that
an internet service provider that “allows [a computer bulletin board service] to reach the
Internet” may be liable for copyright infringement committed by a subscriber of the bulletin
board service).
33. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp.
v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Advanced Comput. Servs. of Mich., Inc.
v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
34. See generally Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 [https://perma.cc/2BFS-EBW7]; Paul H. Farmer, Jr.,
Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire and the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 85 (2014); Jordan L. Ludwig, Note, Protections for Virtual Property; A Modern
Restitutionary Approach, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2012); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An
Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012); Stephen
T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States:
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elements of blockchain technology relevant to this Article’s discussion, before
moving to a more detailed description of the technological basis for digital
uniqueness.35
Distributed ledgers, commonly called blockchains, are databases that no one
entity controls, but that anyone can write to.36 In the case of many blockchains, the
database is a list of who owns what—who owns which bitcoins, for example.37 The
immediate problem of letting anyone write to the database is fraud. What if person
A decides to pay B one unit, but then write to the database that she has retained that
unit?38 Blockchains use a consensus mechanism to make it either too much work
(proof-of-work systems) or too risky (proof-of-stake systems) to attempt to falsify
the ledger.39 This is addressed by a mathematical relationship called a hash, and a
consensus mechanism for verifying hashes.40 A hash is a one-way mathematical
relationship whereby an input generates a unique alphanumeric string of limited

Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014).
35. For anyone wanting an extraordinarily good and relatable introduction to the
technology, I suggest Dan Finlay, Dan’s Intro to How Ethereum Works, YOUTUBE (Feb. 16,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SMliFtoPn8 [https://perma.cc/9WMF-BDCJ].
36. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 34, at 2 (“The blockchain is a distributed, shared,
encrypted‑database that serves as an irreversible and incorruptible public repository of
information. It enables, for the first time, unrelated people to reach consensus on the
occurrence of a particular transaction or event without the need for a controlling authority.”);
Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 808 (arguing that blockchain technology “represents
a significant advance in tracking information about who owns what . . . through a distributed
public ledger that does not require trust in other parties or in a central list authority, and is
robustly resistant to falsification”); Farmer, supra note 34, at 88–89 (“The full record of
transactions is called a block chain, a sequence of records composing a virtual ledger.”).
37. See Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 808 (stating that blockchain technology
facilitates the creation of a public database which tracks “who owns what”); Farmer, supra
note 34, at 89 (describing how Bitcoin utilized its blockchain sequence to create a virtual
public ledger which “allows records to be kept” reflecting who owns which bitcoins).
38. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and
the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 116 (2012) (“[I]t may be
difficult to prevent the same user from double spending the same digital coins by copying
them.”).
39. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 34, at 6 (stating that blockchain uses a
probabilistic approach which makes it too much work for “potential attackers to corrupt a
shared database with false information, unless the attacker owns a majority of the
computational power of the entire network”); Evans, supra note 24, at 237 (describing the
difference between proof-of-work which is based on mining and proof-of-stake which is based
on consensus); BITFURY GROUP, PROOF OF STAKE VERSUS PROOF OF WORK 2 (2015),
https://bitfury.com/content/downloads/pos-vs-pow-1.0.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGA4-7QDL]
(“The idea behind proof of stake is simple: instead of mining power, the probability to create
a block and receive the associated reward is proportional to a user’s ownership stake in the
system.”).
40. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Cryptocurrency and the Myth of the Trustless Transaction,
25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2018) (“[P]roof of work involves encrypting new
transaction requests, along with information about the preceding block in the form of a 16digit number called a ‘hash’ that must be no greater than a target value.”).
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length.41 Anything can be hashed: a picture, the entire text of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, or in the case of blockchains, a list of transactions showing who owns
what.42 The key element to a hash is that if any part of the input is changed, the hash
changes, revealing that a fraudster has attempted to alter some piece of data.
A group of transactions can be recorded in what is called a block.43 New blocks
are created through a process of “mining” in which different computers compete to
solve a complicated math problem, and the computer that wins is rewarded the
block.44 All of the transactions are recorded on that block and the block is closed and
hashed, creating a unique identifying number.45 That number forms the basis for the
next math problem that the miners then try to solve.46 Each block in the chain is
mathematically linked to the block right before and right after it.47 When a new block
is added, it is hashed together with the previous block’s hash.48 Altering one block
would mean that you have to alter every block that came before it.49 The
connectedness of the entire chain protects the blockchain from fraud and
censorship.50

41. See id. at 13 (“The block’s hash serves as a digital fingerprint for the encrypted data,
and a means to verify that the data has not been altered. That means that once a block is created,
it can only be changed by redoing the entire calculation.”). You can see how a hash works
here: XORBIN, https://xorbin.com/tools/sha256-hash-calculator [https://perma.cc/RL7J599B]. Try putting anything into the input box and notice the hashes that come out. If you alter
the input at all, the hash will change.
42. See Evans, supra note 24, at 239 (explaining blockchain hashing as “the process by
which a grouping of digital data is converted into a single ‘number’” whereby the hash serves
as a record of ownership by creating a “unique identifier of the source data or a digital
fingerprint of the source data that cannot be altered”).
43. See Bennett Garner, Merkle Tree Hashing: How Blockchain Verification Works,
COINCENTRAL (Sept. 3, 2018), https://coincentral.com/merkle-tree-hashing-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/YN2C-7ZZF] (writing that in a bitcoin blockchain, a block of transactions
runs through an algorithm to generate a hash which can then be used to verify “the contents of
the block and consistency of multiple ledgers”).
44. See id. (noting that this process allows multiple computers to keep copies of the same
database or ledger to “verify individual records without having to review and compare versions
of the entire database”).
45. See Bratspies, supra note 40, at 13 (“The block’s hash serves as a digital fingerprint
for the encrypted data, and a means to verify that the data has not been altered. That means
that once a block is created, it can only be changed by redoing the entire calculation.”).
46. See Garner, supra note 43 (detailing how each blockchain sequence builds upon
preceding chains).
47. See id. (noting that each transaction added to the blockchain becomes linked with the
blocks preceding and following the chain).
48. See id. (“When that transaction is added to the blockchain, it becomes part of a block
with other transactions.”).
49. See Bratspies, supra note 40, at 13 (“That means that once a block is created, it can
only be changed by redoing the entire calculation. And, as new, later blocks are chained to it,
anyone seeking to alter a particular block, say to remove an included transaction, would also
have to redo all the subsequent blocks.”).
50. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 34, at 6 n.20 (“The blockchain represents
majority consensus through the longest block chain. To succeed in a malicious attack, a
fraudulent node would have to redo all the work of the target block plus all the work of the
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Think of the blockchain like a book of transactions or a ledger. A new page is
added to the book and people are able to write their transaction onto the new page.
Since everyone is able to access the book, we might be worried that someone would
come along and tear a page out, add a new page, or erase and alter a transaction from
an earlier page in the book.51 Blockchain solves those problems. You know that a
page is missing if the book goes from page two to page four without page three. You
know a page is added if there are additional pages or more than one page seven. Each
page is made impossible to alter by laminating and sealing each page. The blockchain
provides similar protections for each information and transaction in virtual space by
allowing each person to maintain a copy of the book and constantly checking each
copy against one another.
A blockchain is a database that remembers state,52 and thus can itself serve as a
database of anything, including another layer of executable code. In the next iteration
of the technology, other applications, called distributed apps (“dapps”), can then be
programmed to run on a blockchain.53 Ethereum is a good example. Think of the
Ethereum blockchain as a large, decentralized computer. Each app runs on that
computer.54 Every computation on Ethereum requires some computing power from
that distributed computer to run the transaction.55 That processing power is paid for

following blocks and surpass the work of the honest nodes.” (citing Satoshi Nakamoto,
Bitcoin: A Peer‑to‑Peer Electronic Cash System 3 (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf)); see
also Garner, supra note 43 (describing how hashing utilizes an algorithm which produces an
unreplicable output from the valid transactions recorded in each blockchain such that any
alteration to the source data is detected as fraudulent conduct because “[e]ven a small change
in the input avalanches to a drastic change in the output”).
51. See Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 820 (“A commonly used analogy is that
of a letterbox. The public key is the address of the letterbox. Anyone can put a letter in. But
only the owner of the letterbox has the key to open it and retrieve the contents.”).
52. A computer remembers state if it recalls previous events and user interactions. A
drawing in the sand that is washed away in the waves does not store state, whereas carvings
in a rock do. The important point is not that the state is permanent (although in a blockchain
it is, due to hashing), but rather that the computer can remember what has gone before and
apply what is happening now.
53. See Nathaniel Popper, Understanding Ethereum, Bitcoin’s Virtual Cousin, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology/what-isethereum.html [https://perma.cc/66N5-JWBU] (“The shared records of the Ethereum
network—of every transaction and computation it has ever performed—are known as a
blockchain, just as the shared records of all Bitcoin transactions are known as a blockchain.”).
54. See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum Whitepaper, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/
whitepaper/#a-next-generation-smart-contract-and-decentralized-application-platform
[https://perma.cc/F92B-VHW4] (last updated Feb. 18, 2022) (describing Ethereum as a
platform for users to build and run decentralized applications through Ethereum’s blockchain
which allows “anyone to write smart contracts and decentralized applications where they can
create their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction formats and state transition
functions”).
https://
55. See
Jake
Frankenfield,
Gas
(Ethereum),
INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gas-ethereum.asp
[https://perma.cc/78FF-HTVN]
(last
updated May 26, 2021) (“Gas refers to the fee, or pricing value, required to successfully
conduct a transaction or execute a contract on the Ethereum blockchain platform.”).
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with ether.56 Users must expend some ether for every transaction they run, known as
a “gas fee.” Ether is burned to generate “gas” which pays the individual people who
maintain the Ethereum Virtual Machine on their computers.57
These distributed apps can in turn create their own token systems by initiating a
smart contract (a program) that acts as its own registry, determining how many
tokens exist, and who owns what—it’s like running an Excel spreadsheet in Google
Drive, a database running on a database.58 These tokens consist of a hash of the
token’s transaction history, a series of basic standard functions and features, like the
transfer function, and functions for determining the number and type of tokens in an
owner’s wallet, or (in the case of NFTs) a URL to find a file related to the token—
the artwork the token represents, for example, and a hash of the artwork as proof.59
The most commonly used standard to make NFTs, and that of most interest to this
paper, is ERC-721.60 ERC-721 produces tokens that are quite different from one
another, of different worth, with different characteristics, and tied to assets with
different values. The value of using a common protocol is that third-party developers
can write programs that interact with it, creating greater interoperability. One token
might represent the virtual equivalent of ownership of Boardwalk or Park Place,
others could represent Mediterranean or Baltic Avenue. Gains or loss in value of one
NFT does not imply a gain or loss in the value of any other token. If an NFT tied to
a digital equivalent of the Mona Lisa were to rise in value, a different NFT tied to
the digital equivalent of my attempt to paint a landscape with Bob Ross’s happy little
trees would not.
Often, an NFT stands for ownership of something not directly stored on the
blockchain—a piece of digital art, for example. So a token representing digital art
might contain a URL pointing to the art and a hash of the art file. In this way, an NFT
might convey an ownership interest in a piece of digital art, an asset in an online

56. See
Terms
of
Use,
AXIE
INFINITY,
https://axieinfinity.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/Z2CR-KMKN] (last updated Feb. 15, 2022) [hereinafter AXIE Terms of Use]
(stating that Ethereum mandates it receives a fraction of proceeds from all transactions known
as a “Gas Fee” to fund “the network of computers that run the decentralized Ethereum
network”); Buterin, supra note 54.
57. See AXIE Terms of Use, supra note 56 (“Ethereum requires the payment of a
transaction fee (a ‘Gas Fee’) for every transaction that occurs on the Ethereum network. The
Gas Fee funds the network of computers that run the decentralized Ethereum network. This
means that you will need to pay a Gas Fee for each transaction that occurs via the App.”).
58. See Buterin, supra note 54 (“What Ethereum intends to provide is a blockchain with
a built-in fully fledged Turing-complete programming language that can be used to create
‘contracts’ that can be used to encode arbitrary state transition functions, allowing users to
create any of the systems described above, as well as many others that we have not yet
imagined, simply by writing up the logic in a few lines of code.”).
59. See Finzer, supra note 1 (“By representing non‑fungible tokens on public blockchains,
developers can build common, reusable, inheritable standards relevant to all non-fungible
tokens. These include such basic primitives as ownership, transfer, and simple access
control.”).
60. See ERC721 Tokens (Non‑Fungible Tokens) Explained, DISTRICT0X EDUC. PORTAL,
https://education.district0x.io/general-topics/understanding-ethereum/erc-721-tokens/
[https://perma.cc/53KX-AFY7] (“ERC721 is a standard interface for Non‑Fungible tokens,
meaning ERC721 tokens are simply a subset of Ethereum tokens.”).
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game, a card in a collectible trading card game (think rare baseball cards here), or a
plot of land in a virtual world. Or, a token might convey rights in a real-world asset,
in an RFID-linked consumer good, or a car that only unlocks and drives for the token
owner.61
B. NFT Examples
The technology only makes NFTs possible. The other side of the value
proposition is which NFTs people purchase and why. This Section briefly touches
on some of the more successful or innovative NFT implementations.
The primary application of NFTs has been art, collectibles, and gaming, which
will be discussed further down in this Section. Other than those spaces, NFT and
blockchain technology has many potential future uses. Amazon, Microsoft, and
JPMorgan all have moved into the blockchain space as part of a prior wave of
adoptions of mainstream blockchain technology.62 Amazon in particular would serve
as the grail of NFT adoption. Its platform has always been more heavily focused on
delivering personal property than licensing intellectual property. eBay is another
internet giant that would benefit immeasurably from creating, promoting, and
providing a marketplace for NFTs. After all, eBay focuses on the resale, rather than
the original sale, for its central business model. NFTs delivered over eBay would
generate profit for the company time and again as they were sold and resold through
eBay’s marketplace. And, both Amazon and eBay have the payments infrastructure
to handle the purchase of NFTs with credit cards, the lack of which ability is a
massive barrier to widespread adoption of NFT purchasing and collecting. And
future applications of the technology, from creating a token system allowing the costfree exchange of real estate title (with no need for title searches, since the chain of
title could be cryptographically secured and rendered unfalsifiable) to voting (where
each vote would be a unique token, fully identifiable to the voter and verifiable as
accurately cast, essentially an NFT system where transfers are only permitted to the
entity approved to receive and count votes) will open in the next few years.

61. See, e.g., How Blockchain Is Making Car Ownership Easier, VINCHAIN (Feb. 13,
2019),
https://vinchain.io/blog/how-blockchain-is-making-car-ownership-easier/296
[https://perma.cc/2GUG-RAER] (“Once a purchase or lease agreement has been signed, a
smart contract can be created to allow only certain drivers access to the vehicle on cars with
automated entry systems.”); Molly Schuetz, Startup Codex Brings Blockchain to Art with
(Feb.
28,
2018,
5:00
AM),
Backing
from
Pantera,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-02-28/startup-codex-brings-blockchain-toart-with-backing-from-pantera [https://perma.cc/3XWU-J2YF] (“Codex has developed a
decentralized database for the market for art and collectibles like antique cars and jewelry.
This protocol would help bring transparency to one of the most valuable aspects of any item
in that category: its provenance.”).
62. See Michael del Castillo, Blockchain Goes to Work at Walmart, Amazon, JPMorgan,
Cargill and 46 Other Enterprises, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/04/16/blockchain-goes-towork/?sh=2661ea132a40 [https://perma.cc/W5PH-2Z8T] (“[C]orporations are embracing the
technology underlying cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and using it to speed up business
processes, increase transparency and potentially save billions of dollars.”).
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Digital art was one of the first applications of NFT technology. Much of what
motivates the sale of physical art—the ability to display the piece, or profit from a
unique piece’s rise in value upon resale—has not been possible in digital space. NFTs
now allow for ownership in digital art to be proven and for the owner to use their
token in various online social spaces.63 Two examples of virtual social displays
beyond the world of NFTs may help to explain the motivation to buy digital art. The
first example is character skins in a video game. From World of Warcraft to Fortnite
and Call of Duty, games have allowed players to alter the physical appearance of
their character without altering any of the characters’ underlying stats or
playability.64 The goal is simply to display to other players that you have a certain
skin: the more unique or scarce, the better. A second example from social media such
as Instagram is the display of likes on a post. The legitimacy of likes is often called
into question as people use bots to artificially increase their numbers.65 Similarly,
skins in a video game could be the result of cheating rather than actually earning the
skin.66 NFTs would allow for these digital displays to be tokenized and verified with
the blockchain. The desire to display motivates people to buy digital NFT art just as
the desire for recognition motivates displays on social media or in a video game.
Consider Rarible, a marketplace for unique digital art. To use the site, an artist
creates a work. They then tokenize copies of the artwork, assigning each to a unique
NFT. Creators transfer NFTs through the marketplace to collectors, who can in turn
transfer the tokens further to other interested buyers as the digital assets rise in value.
Because they are tokenized, the digital artworks are limited in number, and the smart
contract governing token ownership cannot itself be altered once hashed to the
blockchain.67 Rarible recreates a central aspect of the physical art world in the digital

63. See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPERRARE, https://superrare.co/about
[https://perma.cc/6LEQ-WBNM] (“Each artwork on SuperRare is a digital collectible—a
digital object secured by cryptography and tracked on the blockchain. That’s just a fancy way
of saying they’re provably scarce items that can be collected, and that hold value like
cryptocurrencies like ether and bitcoin.”); Meet Rarible, RARIBLE, https://rarible.com/how-itworks [https://perma.cc/CN7R-LR6K] (stating that Rarible is an NFT marketplace which
facilitates the sale of digital artwork through Ethereum’s blockchain).
64. See Ruchir Sharma, Opinion, People Aren’t Reading or Watching Movies. They’re
Gaming., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/15/opinion/
fortnite-epic-apple-gaming.html [https://perma.cc/7KM2-D4KN] (writing how Fortnite
allows users to purchase virtual accessories which alter their character’s physical appearance
including “equipment, outfits (‘skins’), dance moves, even branded merchandise from outside
vendors like the National Football League”).
65. See Sapna Maheshwari, How Bots Are Inflating Instagram Egos, N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/media/instagram-bots.html [https://
perma.cc/US9M-V62F] (stating that some social media influencers on Instagram use bots “to
increase their numbers so brands will work with them”).
66. See Davey Winder, Fortnite Hackers Earn $1 Million A Year—Stealing Your Skins,
(Aug.
27,
2020,
6:09
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
FORBES
daveywinder/2020/08/27/heres-how-fortnite-hackers-make-1-million-a-year-epic-gamespasswords/?sh=78ae9e535d42 [https://perma.cc/FWQ8-4JV6] (describing how some hackers
make upward of $25,000 a week from stealing character skins earned or purchased in game
by Fortnite players).
67. See Rarible.com FAQ, NOTION, https://www.notion.so/rarible-com-FAQ-
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space—the ability to capture the rise in value of a piece of art. Prior to NFTs and
marketplaces like Rarible, people were unable to effectively trade in decentralized
digital assets. Rarible creates a marketplace that not only has led to a burgeoning
trade in NFTs as buyers sell their purchases forward, but also allows content creators
to make money from downstream sales of their products.68 Such an incentive, while
unusual in the realm of IP, may lead to an increase in artists adopting the platform in
the early stages of NFT development.
Another digital art marketplace, SuperRare, stores a hash of the digital art piece
directly in the token on the smart contract.69 Other digital art marketplaces keep the
art stored in a file that exists off the Ethereum blockchain, and the token keeps a
record of who owns that file. With SuperRare, the art is in the token itself, so when
someone buys a token, the art will continue to exist even after someone has stopped
maintaining the external server. SuperRare has also focused more heavily on
developing a social context for the owned items by creating a digital art social media
space rather than simply a marketplace.70 As their website indicates, “collecting is
inherently social,” and part of the value of owning art is having the ability to display
it in a collection or gallery.71 Thus, SuperRare creates the ability to share an art
collection on the website and in virtual reality galleries.72
A distinct application of NFTs, although not dissimilar from digital art, is NFT
collectibles. Collectibles are more like Beanie Babies than Picassos. While both
involve a mix of token and intellectual property, collectibles are valuable because of
the social context—a game, a narrative, a shared experience—of which they are a
part. The value of collectibles comes in the collecting and trading of the items in
addition to displaying and selling. Two valuable lines of NFT collectibles,
CryptoKitties and Axies, became extremely popular and valuable when NFT
technology first took off, and the success of these two brands represents not only the
excitement around NFTs but also the promise of future application.73

a47b276aa1994f7c8e3bc96d700717c5 [https://perma.cc/974S-93AN] (“As an artist, by
tokenizing your work you both ensure that it is unique and brand it as your work. The actual
ownership is blockchain‑managed.”).
68. See Rarible, Introducing $RARI — the First Governance Token in the NFT Space,
MEDIUM (July 15, 2020), https://rarible.medium.com/introducing-rari-the-first-governancetoken-in-the-nft-space-5dbcc55b6c43 [https://perma.cc/QV88-3QER] (supplying artists with
$RARI, Rarible’s digital currency token, for the sale of his or her digital artwork in Rarible’s
virtual marketplace).
69. See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPERRARE, https://superrare.co/about
[https://perma.cc/3TZJ-KYJ7] (“Each artwork is authentically created by an artist in the
network, and tokenized as a crypto-collectible digital item that you can own and trade.”).
70. See id. (“Since digital collectibles have a transparent record of ownership, they’re
perfect for a social environment. The social layer can make it easier to assess value and other
context around items in the marketplace. Also, it’s more fun!”).
71. Id.
72. See id. (detailing that SuperRare is a digital marketplace to collect, showcase, trade,
buy, and sell “unique, single‑edition digital artworks”).
73. See Finzer, supra note 1 (explaining how CryptoKitties “was the first project to take
NFTs to the mainstream” in late 2017 and that CryptoKitties’ success ushered in a
technological renaissance in “early 2018 as investors and entrepreneurs started to think about
a new way to own digital stuff”).
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CryptoKitties, a collectibles fad that sold millions of dollars’ worth of NFTs
beginning in 2017, were the breakout success story for NFT technology.74 “Kitties”
are pictures of cats tied to a particular ERC-721 token. Ownership of the tokens was
determined by a smart contract. When an owner wanted to sell a kitty, the token was
traded from one wallet to another, and the ownership interest recorded by the smart
contract. As is usually the case with cryptocurrencies and NFTs, the value of the
CryptoKitty was in the system: other people wanted them, either to breed (creating
new CryptoKitties with new characteristics) or to sell. Some kitties were sold for
high amounts of money, although it is not clear that the sales prices represented actual
valuations as much as a way of surreptitiously moving cash.75 In either case,
CryptoKitties captured people’s attention and imagination because of the ability to
breed, trade, and play with the virtual cats in a rich online community.76
CryptoKitties took the first step into an entirely new marketplace that will pave the
way for more mainstream applications.
Following in the footsteps of CryptoKitties, Axie Infinite expanded the
application of collectible items into an even richer online gaming environment. On
Axie, users can buy and breed Axies, which look like little monsters.77 Each monster
can then be used in adventure- or arena-style gameplay with or against other
players.78 Axie does more than customizable skins for characters and actually allows
players to create a fully unique character. Think of an MMORPG79 version of
Pokémon, except every monster is different. On Axie, players are able to make
money by selling their Axies, land in game, and collectible items. Players have
engaged in transactions in ETH with a value equivalent to 39 million USD on the
Axie marketplace with the most expensive Axie selling for 300 ETH (at the time,
over 100,000 USD).80

74. See Evans, supra note 24, at 250 (“Cryptokitties, the first blockchain project to utilize
the ERC‑721 standard successfully, is an Ethereum‑based digital collectible gaming platform
in which players can buy, sell, trade, and breed digital cats that the user actually owns.
Cryptokitties became all the rage—and virtually crippled the Ethereum Network—at the end
of 2017.”).
75. See id. at 251 (writing that some CryptoKitties “have little to no value, although others
are valued in the tens of thousands of dollars”); Neer Varshney, Someone Paid $170,000 for
the Most Expensive CryptoKitty Ever, NEXT WEB (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/09/05/most-expensive-cryptokitty/ [https://perma.cc/
DJ7E-VESA] (reporting that one CryptoKitty named Dragon sold for approximately $170,000
and noting, “there can be only speculations on what makes [Dragon] so precious. Perhaps the
buyer and seller wanted to make a transaction anyway, so they traded this CryptoKitty? Some
speculate it could be money laundering”).
76. See Wilson, supra note 29, at 380 (“Cryptokitties helps educate users about the unique
features of blockchain, like digital scarcity and smart contracts, by turning cats into data, in
this case a set of cattributes, that are stored as a hash value on the Ethereum blockchain . . . .”).
77. See Axie Infinity, Axie Community Alpha: Getting Started!, LUNACIAN (Jan. 8, 2020)
https://axie.substack.com/p/axie-community-alpha-getting-started [https://perma.cc/39UAZAC7] (“Axie Infinity is a digital pet universe where players battle, raise, and trade fantasy
creatures called Axies!”).
78. See id.
79. Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game.
80. See AXIE INFINITY, axieinfinity.com/ [https://perma.cc/76MJ-4R2V].
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An almost painfully obvious application of NFTs is in the digital trading card
space. Everything that made Magic: The Gathering an international success
translates seamlessly into an online platform. Another early adoption of NFT
technology, Gods Unchained, is pioneering a new space in collectible card games.
On the Gods Unchained platform, players can unlock cards by playing the game,
then sell and trade the cards in an online marketplace.81 In addition to the
collectability of the cards, the cards have value due to their context within the game.
Instead of storing cards in a box, cards are stored in a digital wallet and ownership is
verified on the blockchain. Instead of pay-to-win, freemium-style games like
Farmville, Gods Unchained is the first in what is likely to be a fruitful play-to-earn
space of gaming. Players who are used to pouring thousands of dollars into their
games will now be able to retain productive ownership over in-game items and see
money return for their time put in.
NFTs have uses beyond digital assets as well. Zora, an NFT-enabled “Everything
Exchange,” allows users to sell rare or unique items on their marketplace using
tokens.82 Every item is given an NFT, and users are able to buy, sell, and trade the
tokens on the exchange.83 Rather than being tied to a piece of digital art, the token is
tied to a physical item. The token allows users on Zora to trade the item and capture
its rise in value without ever having to ship the item. Once someone wants to buy the
physical item, they can redeem the token and the physical item will be sent to them.84
Further applications of NFTs to physical assets could allow for more efficient
markets for heavily traded assets such as physical art, cars, and even land.
Following the success of brands that first rose alongside NFT technology, more
traditional intellectual property rights holders have begun to follow suit. Major
League Baseball, which has long been a behemoth in the collectibles space with
trading cards, bobbleheads, and more, started an on-chain game called MLB
Champions.85 Users are able to collect baseball player bobbleheads and play them
against other people in online baseball games.
Similar to MLB, the NBA has started tying memorable moments of basketball
history to the blockchain. On NBA Top Shot, basketball fans can buy great plays
from NBA games in the form of cubes that contain a brief highlight reel, the score of

81. See
GODS
UNCHAINED,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
https://godsunchained.com/learn/faq [https://perma.cc/2P4W-AHBP] (“In Gods Unchained
players completely own their digital items, giving them the freedom to trade, sell and use their
cards any way they like – just like owning real, tangible cards.”).
82. See Zora Team, How to Buy and Sell on Zora, ZORA (July 30, 2020),
https://blog.ourzora.com/home/how-to-buy-and-sell [https://perma.cc/GFG7-P2P5] (“Zora is
the Everything Exchange. It’s where anyone in the world can buy, sell and trade limitededition goods and art.”).
83. See id. (“Zora utilizes cryptocurrencies—a paradigm shifting technology that gives
anyone in the world the power to create, share and exchange value.”).
84. See Jeff John Roberts, Hype Beasts, the ‘Yeezy’ Problem, and $950 Cassette Tapes:
How Crypto Startup Zora Is Helping Musicians Create New Revenue Streams, FORTUNE (Sept.
27, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/09/27/zora-crypto-startup-music-businessrevenue-streams-yeezy-hype-beasts/ [https://perma.cc/AT84-B5MK].
85. See MLB CHAMPIONS Homepage, supra note 21.
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the game, other stats, and team logos.86 Cubes have been consistently listed on the
Top Shot Marketplace for over $50,000.87 Since launch, there have been over $942
million in Top Shot sales.88 NBA Top Shot has the additional advantage of being
easy to set up and start trading. Users can log in with a Gmail account and pay directly
with a linked credit card or use one of the many cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or
Ethereum.89 Top Shot creates a balance between people who want to operate
exclusively in the crypto space and those who want to collect NBA moments but are
unfamiliar with crypto and blockchain technology. The incorporation of traditional
IP into the NFT market has successfully combined the innovative technology with
the demand created by businesses like the MLB and NBA.
As other established IP giants start to turn their attention to the NFT collectible
space, the use of the technology is likely to become more widespread. Imagine
companies like Disney, Marvel, Hasbro, and more creating lines of NFT products
that are tied to context-rich digital spaces. More people will begin trading and using
NFTs and the blockchain without having to understand the finer technical details of
the underlying technology. More companies are likely to follow in the footsteps of
NBA Top Shot and create platforms that are appealing to NFT natives while still
being easy to understand for the less tech savvy. While IP giants getting involved in
the NFT space will certainly increase demand for NFTs, these companies are likely
to take advantage of the same intellectual property regime that they have been using
online for years before NFTs. Users will be able to “own the underlying NFT
completely,” but will only possess a “non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free
license to use, copy, and display the Art.”90 The restrictions posed by this intellectual
property regime is discussed more fully in Section II.C below.
C. Technical Clawbacks of Digital Rights
The value of NFTs rests on a simple value proposition: that a purchaser of an NFT
owns it free and clear. The problem is that this proposition is not yet entirely true.
There are two central difficulties, one addressed here, and one in the next Part. The
first, addressed here, is that the technological implementation of NFTs leaves room

86. See Tommy Beer, How Did a LeBron James Video Highlight Sell For $71,455? A
Look At A Burgeoning Product Called NBA Top Shot, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2021, 5:42 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2021/01/23/how-did-a-lebron-james-videohighlight-sell-for-71455-a-look-at-a-burgeoning-product-called-nba-topshot/?sh=6249838d184b [https://perma.cc/9FN8-Y2MY] (describing NBA Top Shot as a
“blockchain‑based platform that allows fans to buy, sell and trade numbered versions of
specific video highlights”).
87. NBA TOP SHOT, https://www.nbatopshot.com/search?orderBy=PRICE_USD_DESC
[https://perma.cc/GX7C-Q7T3].
88. CRYPTO SLAM!, https://cryptoslam.io/ [https://perma.cc/QR3D-YGL2] (choose Alltime) (stating that NBA Top Shot has produced over $942 million in sales as of March 10,
2022).
89. What to Expect: Fees & Finances, NBA TOP SHOT (June 14, 2020, 12:53 PM),
https://blog.nbatopshot.com/posts/fees-finances [https://perma.cc/CP2V-DHAM].
90. Terms of Use, NBA TOP SHOT (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.nbatopshot.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/9749-UQDM].

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 196

6/15/22 12:58 PM

2022]

LAW OF NON-FUNGIBLE TOKENS

1279

for those who sell NFTs to exert lingering control over a fully bought and paid for
asset. The second, addressed in the following Section, is that the legal framework
surrounding NFTs is not conducive to ownership, because the intellectual property
regime that currently governs the internet is hostile to digital personal property
ownership, imposing the contract-and-licensing regime of intellectual property
instead.
NFTs are sold with the following representations: that an NFT token is the asset
it represents, that the purchaser owns the asset, that the seller of the asset has no
further control over an asset once conveyed, and thus that the buyer of the asset can
do as they wish with it.91 NFTs are sold on a promise similar to the promise one
receives when buying a physical object. When a person buys a book from a brickand-mortar bookstore, she owns that physical book, and is able to do what she wants
with it, including sell it, read it, throw it away, or donate it. Digital property has never
carried such a promise, and NFTs now attempt to offer it.92 But after examining the
underlying technology, those representations are not precisely true.
Imagine, for instance, that you fully bought and paid for a car, to only find out
later that you were physically or technologically prevented from selling it to someone
else. Constraints on the purchaser’s right to transfer cut to the very heart of the NFT

91. What
Is
CryptoKitties?,
CRYPTOKITTIES,
https://www.cryptokitties.co/
[https://perma.cc/7WEL-AUDF] (“Each cat is one-of-a-kind and 100% owned by you; it
cannot be replicated, taken away, or destroyed.”); Frequently Asked Questions: General, GODS
UNCHAINED, https://godsunchained.com/learn/faq [https://perma.cc/259T-GMPD] (“In Gods
Unchained players completely own their digital items, giving them the freedom to trade, sell
and use their cards any way they like – just like owning real, tangible cards.”); David Moore,
Terms of Service: Terms of Service for KnownOrigin Labs, MEDIUM,
https://medium.com/knownorigin/terms-of-service-3efae6d0c20f
[https://perma.cc/H29EVGPN] (last updated Apr. 23, 2021) (“Owning a Token is just like owning a physical artwork,
like an original painting or print.”); Own Something Extraordinary, CRYPTOGRAPH,
https://www.cryptograph.co/About [https://perma.cc/F392-GMFS] (“Cryptographs are oneof-a-kind digital creations made by world icons and artists. Thanks to blockchain technology
a Cryptograph is 100% owned by its collector and it cannot be forged.”); What is a Sorare
Card?, SORARE, https://help.sorare.com/hc/en-us/articles/4402780446097-What-is-a-Sorarecard- [https://perma.cc/V7CH-PT8G] (“A Sorare Card is an officially licensed digital
collectible of a footballer . . . . Each collectible enjoys many of the attributes of other
blockchain-assets: it cannot be copied or taken away from you.”); AXIE Terms of Use, supra
note 56 (“Axie Infinity is a distributed application that is currently running on the Ethereum
Network and Ronin Network . . . , using specially-developed smart contracts . . . to enable
users to own, transfer, battle, and breed genetically unique digital creatures. It also enables
users to own and transfer other digital assets . . . .”); Terms of Service, TERRAVIRTUA,
https://terravirtua.io/terms-service [https://perma.cc/E99E-QYDP] (“The Site allows (1) users
to create a profile where they can post certain information about themselves, link to other
websites, and display Digital Collectibles that they own . . . .”); see also We Are Mythical: A
Next Generation Game Technology Studio, MYTHICAL GAMES, https://mythical.games/
[https://perma.cc/U6H7-HTEU] (“We believe that true ownership of digital assets, verifiable
scarcity, and integrated secondary markets are the future of games.”).
92. See Finzer, supra note 1 (explaining how non‑fungible tokens on public blockchains
will allow developers to build “common, reusable, inheritable standards relevant to all
non‑fungible tokens” such that the next generation of digital property will enable users to have
the same basic primitives of physical “ownership, transfer, and simple access control”).
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value proposition. One function bandied about (although not often implemented) is
the ability to code the transfer function of the token to be “pausable,” such that the
original creator of the token can pause its future transfer.93 The ability to pause a
token certainly has justifications. Consider a collectible card game whose creators
must take a game-breaking card out of circulation.94 While pausing is an
understandable precaution in some circumstances, it strongly cuts against the
representations to the buyer that an NFT creator has no further ability to interfere
with or control the disposition of a token.
Another frequent restriction on ownership is kickbacks paid to the original content
creator for downstream sales. Imagine that when you sell your used car to a friend
that you had to pay Ford $500. Such is the case on many NFT markets such as
Rarible. The buyer of art on the Rarible marketplace purchases a token tied to a piece
of art. The art and the token are bound together by a URL and perhaps a metadata
file pointing to and describing the artwork, so that the token proves that it is related
to the art.95 But the token is not itself the art. The token merely shows that the token
and the art have an immutable and unfalsifiable relationship. When the owner of a
token tied to a piece of art on Rarible goes to sell that art, a portion of the sales price
will be conveyed back to the creator of the token through the automated mechanisms
of the governing smart contract.96 Creators certainly have an incentive to sell such
works, as they capture a fraction of each resale forward. But the result is the opposite
of normal rules for the sale of goods. A book, once sold, does not kick back a
percentage of future sales to the author. When we buy a car, we do not expect a
portion of its sales price to be forwarded back to the person who sold it to us when
we go to sell it.97 Tokens that claw back a portion of the profit each time they are
resold do not square with the representation that a buyer of an NFT owns it free and
clear.
This value clawback functions via tinkering with the transfer function defined in
the NFT smart contract. The smart contract that creates the tokens creates a range of

93. See Stephen Hall, How to Make a Pausable ERC20 Token, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://medium.com/coinmonks/how-to-make-a-pausable-erc20-token-9fb1ab5dc877
[https://perma.cc/FCA8-YP3K] (“Simply put, a pausable ERC20 token is a token that can be
paused to prevent any transfers of the token when it is paused.”).
94. See, e.g., Scott Baird, Magic The Gathering: 15 Cards That Had to Be Banned Before
(or After) They Broke the Game, SCREENRANT (Sept. 23, 2017), https://screenrant.com/magicthe-gathering-cards-broke-the-game-banned/ [https://perma.cc/BT3Q-LGSD].
95. See Finzer, supra note 1 (“Metadata provides descriptive information for a specific
token ID. In the case of the CryptoKitty, the metadata is the name of the cat, the picture of the
cat, a description, and any additional traits (called ‘cattributes’, in the case of CryptoKitties).”).
96. See SUPERRARE, supra note 63 (“For primary sales, there is a 15% commission
(creators receive 85%). For secondary sales, creators receive a 10% commission (aka royalty),
providing passive revenue from an artwork if it continues to trade on the secondary market.”);
RARIBLE, supra note 63 (noting that Rarible’s digital currency, $RARI, is reserved for
distribution to “sellers and buyers'' on the Rarible marketplace).
97. Such regimes are preempted by copyright, including its “first sale” doctrine that
protects buyers’ right to resell. See Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.
2018) (holding that claims under the California Resale Royalty Act, which “grant[ed] artists
an unwaivable right to 5% of the proceeds on any resale of their artwork under specified
circumstances,” were preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act).
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features for the token, defining the number of tokens created, a protocol for giving
third parties (such as a wallet or exchange) the ability to move tokens, fields for a
URL or metadata file (or both) pointing to actual art elsewhere, and most importantly,
a transfer function.98 That transfer function can be written—as Rarible does—to
move portions of each sale of a token back to the original creator’s account. Although
some NFT creators, like SuperRare, have separate market logic, meaning that the
token can be transferred without having to go through any given virtual marketplace,
other contracts are written so that transfer can only happen within the confines of a
certain virtual market, which has been written to provide additional controls to the
market creator.99
This distinction matters. The problem is not that a marketplace takes a cut of
sales—auctioneers do, from Sotheby’s to eBay. The difficulty is that by coding the
seller’s cut into the token, the seller becomes a part owner of the asset: they take a
cut wherever the asset is sold. One of the key ways of determining ownership
throughout law is to look at who gains when the property rises in value, and who
loses when the property falls in value.100 When sellers code their cut of the NFT’s
rise and fall directly into the token, they become hidden part owners. They have not
sold the NFT free and clear after all.
Nor are the smart contracts that act as registry lists of who owns which tokens
immune from the interference of the companies that create them. A smart contract,
once coded to the blockchain, is of course immutable. Once the virtual machine’s
state has been hashed into the blockchain, the entity that coded it cannot alter it. But
there are several caveats. Smart contracts can be hacked, as in the case of the
Decentralized Autonomous Organization, where fifty million dollars’ worth of
invested funds were stolen.101 Thus, smart contract code may need to be updated to

98. See Finzer, supra note 1 (“By representing non‑fungible tokens on public blockchains,
developers can build common, reusable, inheritable standards relevant to all non‑fungible
tokens. These include such basic primitives as ownership, transfer, and simple access
control.”).
99. Id. (writing that smart contracts “allow developers to place hard caps on the supply of
non‑fungible tokens” as well as enforce “persistent properties” such as which virtual markets
a token can be transferred to or sold within).
100. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020); WorldCom, Inc. v. Gen.
Elec. Glob. Asset Mgmt. Servs. (In re WorldCom, Inc.), 339 B.R. 56, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“At common law, the central feature of a true lease is the reservation of an
economically meaningful interest to the lessor at the end of the lease term. Ordinarily this
means two things: (1) at the outset of the lease the parties expect the goods to retain some
significant residual value at the end of the lease term; and (2) the lessor retains some
entrepreneurial stake (either the possibility of gain or the risk of loss) in the value of the goods
at the end of the lease term.” (quoting Edwin E. Huddleson, III, Old Wine in New Bottles:
UCC Article 2A—Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 615, 625 (1998)). Similarly, another commentator
explains the principle in reference to the parties’ “entrepreneurial stake,” the “up-side right or
a down-side risk,” that each party has in the value of the leased equipment. JAMES WHITE &
ROBERT SUMMERS, WHITE AND SUMMERS’ UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22–3, at 1162–63
(6th ed. 2010).
101. See Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the
TIMES
(June
17,
2016),
World
of
Virtual
Currency,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-
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patch vulnerabilities. The process of doing so is termed “wrapping.” An existing
smart contract can be wrapped inside another smart contract, which assigns the
tokens in contract A with features B, C, and D to tokens in contract W, with features
X, Y, and Z. Users are then migrated from contract A to contract W, and a user who
wishes to insist on the features and data of contract A finds themselves out of date
and alone, the value of their asset greatly diminished if not destroyed. The
inevitability of hacking and the necessity of updating software through wrapping
indicates that the promises about the permanence and immutability of NFT smart
contracts are overblown.
Transfer control, pausing, and wrapping are merely three ways in which claims
of ownership over NFTs are, as a matter of design, less than the absolute package of
ownership rights that NFT creators often promote to their purchasers. This by no
means prevents the creation of enforceable property interests, any more than the
ability to forge a deed prevents us from owning houses. However, such technical
means of reasserting control over NFTs does raise the need for law that protects
ownership interests. Just as a forged deed to a home would be declared invalid under
the law, so a robust law of personal online property would deem certain types of
transfers (say, a transfer back to the minter of a particularly valuable asset based on
code in the transfer function) invalid. Legal remedies like conversion (a claim that
one person took another’s property and must pay), replevin (a claim that one person
must return another’s property) and trespass to chattels (a claim that a person has so
interfered with another’s use and enjoyment of their property as to give rise to
damages) are therefore important supplements to the technology. Law must act as an
enabling backstop to NFT technologies, as will be further discussed in Parts II and
III, below.
D. NFT Taxonomy
This Section seeks to map a taxonomy of NFTs and their attributes that can serve
as a guide for later discussions on ownership restrictions. There are three large factors
that dictate the rights of NFT purchasers: storage of the item being tokenized, the
context for the value of the NFT, and the surrounding IP agreements circumscribing
the use of the item.102
The first major factor to consider is where the item is actually stored. Take for
example a piece of digital art that a user buys from Rarible. When that art is

than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html
[https://perma.cc/97KV6EVN] (writing how a hacker in 2016 “siphoned more than $50 million of digital money
away” from the Decentralized Autonomous Organization which had “raised $160 million in
the form of Ether, an alternative to the digital currency Bitcoin”).
102. See Finzer, supra note 1 (“But if digital ownership is more like ownership in the
physical world (the freedom to hold and transfer indefinitely), this doesn’t always seem to be
the case with digital assets. Rather, you own these assets in specific contexts, which may or
may not make moving them around easy.”); SuperRare Terms of Service, NOTION,
https://www.notion.so/SuperRare-Terms-of-Service-075a82773af34aab99dde323f5aa044e
[https://perma.cc/2JMK-WMXL] (last updated Feb. 15, 2022) (setting forth the legally
binding terms and conditions that a SuperRare user must consent to before joining the
platform).
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purchased, the smart contract transfers a token indicating that the buyer owns the art.
The art itself may be stored electronically somewhere else. The process is similar to
transferring a deed to a piece of real estate. The deed signifies ownership, but the real
estate is still wherever it was before.
When it comes to transferring NFTs, the location of the item matters. The two
main options for storage are on-chain and off-chain storage.103 Off-chain storage
means that the art or other digital item being purchased is stored somewhere else in
a centralized server.104 The token that someone buys merely keeps a record of who
owns that item. The token contains a pointer that indicates that the token is tied to
the digital item being sold, similar to a deed that has the address of the property being
bought. Off-chain storage items are subject to deletion. Items that are stored off-chain
will cease to exist if the company maintaining the storage server ceases to exist, or
even turns off the server.105 A user may also be subject to additional restrictions that
are imposed by the server host. When a digital item is stored on-chain, the art itself
is hashed directly into the token.106 On-chain storage allows for the item to continue
existing even if the original company hosting the item on its servers no longer exists.
On-chain storage thus provides greater security for a purchaser because the value of
the NFT is no longer tied to the continued existence of any one particular server or
company.107 The downside of on-chain storage is that space is much more limited.108
Only smaller bits of data can be stored and traded directly in the tokens.
The second major consideration is how context-rich the environment for a
particular NFT is. Property, both physical and digital, derives value from the context
of which it is a part: think of the impact of a neighborhood on the value of a house.
This means that control over the context in which property is used constitutes control
over the property itself. To extend the house analogy, consider the power of a
Homeowners’ Association over individual property owners. What powerful context
creates in grounding the value of property; it also can often cost in restricting owners’
control.

103. See Finzer, supra note 1 (“The first decision for developers is what metadata to
represent on‑chain vs. off‑chain.”).
104. See id. (describing how off‑chain data storage is required when the transaction data
exceeds “the current storage limitations of the Ethereum blockchain” and therefore requires
storage in a “centralized server somewhere, or a cloud storage solution like AWS”).
105. See id. (identifying one of the primary downsides of off‑chain data storage is that “if
the project goes offline, the metadata could disappear from its original source” and thereby
cease to exist).
106. See id. (stating that when a digital item is stored on‑chain, it denotes that the metadata
was baked “directly into the smart contract representing the tokens”).
107. See id. (“The benefits of representing metadata on‑chain are: 1) it permanently resides
with the token, persisting beyond the lifecycle of any given application, and 2) it can change
in accordance with on‑chain logic. Point #1 is important if assets are intended to have
long‑lasting value far beyond their original creation. For example, a piece of digital art is
expected to persist throughout the ages, regardless of whether the original website that was
used to create the art is still around.”).
108. See id. (noting that despite the benefits of on‑chain metadata, most “projects store
their metadata off‑chain simply due to the current storage limitations of the Ethereum
blockchain”).
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Just like physical property, NFTs vary in the richness of their surrounding context.
And just like physical property, varying levels of context leads to varying levels of
owner control. NFT vendors often control the context that creates value. Consider
the value of a card in a collectible trading card game. The card has value because it
is playable within the game, because the game’s software accepts the card as a
legitimate play in the game. That game software can change, and the value of the
collectible would radically alter as a result. If the game creators determined that the
card were no longer a legitimate play, it would not matter that the owner of the token
could buy, sell, or transfer it. To be clear, this stands as no strong impediment to
recognizing property interests in NFTs, any more than the existence of HOAs vitiates
ownership interest in houses. Property can change in value, and to be an owner means
to accept the risk of such shifts. But investors in NFTs are well advised to note that
collectibles which are heavily dependent on playability, relationships with other
assets, or other recognition by entities in control of the value-generating context, will
be subject to a surprising degree of lingering contextual control.
The last major restriction on NFT ownership is the IP agreements that
circumscribe an owner’s use of the item they bought, which will be explored in
greater depth in Part II, below. IP agreements range from not allowing owners to use
the NFT in personal branding or advertising to restricting the marketplace in which
someone can trade their NFT.109 NFT license agreements are the fine print “clickwrap” underlying the bold claims of “true digital ownership.” Imagine buying a book
but discovering that an IP agreement only allowed you to read it on Thursday
afternoons. Buying an Axie that is bound by an IP agreement is just licensing with
extra steps.
NFTs that are tied to physical property can avoid many of the pitfalls created by
storage, weak contextual environments, and restrictive IP agreements. NFTs have
only just begun to be utilized in physical space with marketplaces like Zora, but it
represents a potential goldmine for NFT application. Connecting a physical asset to
an NFT could be as simple as using a QR code or serial number. There is no shortage
of physical collectibles, including trading cards, art, stuffed animals, comic books,
bobbleheads, and more. All of them could be tracked with NFTs and traded in online
markets. Owners of NFTs tied to physical assets would not have to worry about
storage restrictions or IP clawback that undermine the ownership interest: their
concerns would be more mundane—whether the asset for which they own an NFT
has been properly stored, for example, or damaged, or whether it exists at all.
II. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEMS
The current online legal regime surrounding digital asset purchases strongly
supports the ability of an intellectual property rightsholder to claw back significant
rights from purchasers.110 In 2009, owners of George Orwell’s 1984 were surprised

109. See Birgit Clark & Ruth Burstall, Crypto‑Pie in the Sky? How Blockchain Technology
is Impacting Intellectual Property Law, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 252, 257 (2019)
(detailing how smart contracts could be used to enforce IP agreements which may govern
licenses and payment to IP owners, in addition to “rights management information, such as
ownership, use permissions and payment[s]”).
110. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 43 (“[Y]ou made a copy of copyrighted

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 202

6/15/22 12:58 PM

2022]

LAW OF NON-FUNGIBLE TOKENS

1285

to see that Amazon had deleted the book from their Kindle accounts because the
company that had added the book did not own the rights.111 Because the digital
publisher which had sold Orwell’s books did not possess the right to do so, all copies
that they had sold were deleted from buyers’ accounts.112 In 2018, Dapper Labs
created three special CryptoKitties based on NBA star Stephen Curry.113 Just as the
digital publisher did not have the rights to publish 1984, the creators of the
Currykitties did not have the rights to Stephen Curry’s likeness. As a result, Dapper
Labs pulled the Currykitties from their website.114
The legal regime for digital personal property must evolve to support purchaser
expectations for a kind of online ownership that has until now not been available.
NFTs are expressly sold on the basis of narratives of ownership. Sites assert boldly,
“If you can’t sell your items, you don’t own them,” and promote “true ownership for
players.”115 NFT businesses sell ownership. Yet selling ownership of digital assets
flies in the teeth of the past two decades of legal development, which has all but
eradicated ownership interests online in favor of a contract and licensing regime with
which any purchaser of a Kindle eBook, video game, or subscriber to an online
service is familiar.116

material when you turned your device on – you loaded copyrighted material from storage into
active memory. And if you make that copy without a license – if you don't click ‘I Agree’ to
the terms and conditions of the rightsholder – then you've infringed copyright.”).
111. See Stone, supra note 30 (“[T]he books were added to the Kindle store by a company
that did not have rights to them.”).
112. See id. (describing how issues over licensing rights led to consumers losing the books
they had purchased).
113. See Nikhilesh De, NBA Superstar Steph Curry Is Now the First Celebrity CryptoKitty,
COINDESK (May 7, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/nba-superstar-steph-currynow-first-celebrity-cryptokitty [https://perma.cc/44QH-E74R] (“Curry will be launching the
first-ever celebrity-branded CryptoKitty.”).
114. See Founder Starcoin, Inc. v. Launch Labs, Inc., No. 18-CV-972 JLS (MDD), 2018
WL 3343790, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018) (“Dapper Labs released three ‘CurryKitties’ based
on the likeness of NBA star Stephen Curry. Dapper Labs later pulled the CurryKitties from its
website because it discovered that the parties involved in the licensing transaction did not have
rights to Mr. Curry’s likeness.” (citations omitted)); see also William Suberg, CelebrityThemed CryptoKitties Take a ‘Cat Nap’ Amid NDA Lawsuit, COINTELEGRAPH (May 25, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/celebrity-themed-cryptokitties-take-a-cat-nap-amid-ndalawsuit [https://perma.cc/WR9H-DY98] (“We have reason to believe Steph wasn't as involved
in the CurryKitties as we thought. Until we’re sure he's an active participant, we're suspending
the campaign.”).
115. GODS UNCHAINED, https://godsunchained.com/ [https://perma.cc/YJL6-QKWF]
(“Unlike other free-to-play games, Gods Unchained gives you complete ownership over your
in-game items. Collect rare cards, build your deck and sell cards to other players.” (emphasis
omitted)).
116. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 45 (describing the difference between
contracting in online versus physical spaces).
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A. The Legal Literature
The legal literature on NFTs is very much in its infancy. There are two sets of
literature worth noting. First, there is a moderately developed literature on smart
contracts, the programs that run on blockchains and execute transfers of NFTs.
Second, there is a nascent literature on the potential property uses of blockchain
technology, beginning with articles on bitproperty and culminating in a very limited
selection discussing NFTs. The following Sections address each in turn.
1. The Smart Contract Fallacy
The programs that create and convey NFTs are called smart contracts, an
unfortunate early nomenclature developed from crypto-theorists’ desire to do away
with law. The idea behind calling a blockchain program a smart contract was that the
program would replace the legal instrument or that law would no longer be needed
if the programs were automatically executable.117 But the analogy was born largely
out of technologists’ misunderstanding of what a contract is: a contract is the making
of promises, not the means of their execution.118 Automatically executing programs
are not contracts if there has been no bargained-for exchange of promises or intent
to enter into binding legal relations.119
The contract analogy for blockchain-based code has largely been an unfortunate
false start.120 Nearly every legal analysis of smart contracts concludes that while the
code might help execute a contract, smart contract programs are not themselves
contracts.121 Contracts are bargains, expressed intentions, not code.122 To provide a

117. See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313,
322 (2017) (“The evolution from electronic, to data-oriented, to computable contracts
embodies a trend toward greater machine autonomy. As computers can increasingly replace
humans in negotiating, forming, performing, and enforcing contracts, contracts can
increasingly operate with the speed and consistency of machines.”); Harry Surden,
Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 639–40 (2012) (differentiating between
traditional contracts memorialized with words and data-oriented contracts memorialized in
computer data).
118. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 8 (2d ed. 2015) (“By promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral
into one that is morally compelled.”).
119. See id. at 14 (noting that the institution of a promise is a necessary and required
component of contract formation whereby one party binds themself “to another so that the
other may expect a future performance”).
120. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 117, at 339 (noting that in “a very real way, smart
contracts are not intended to be legally enforceable” because parties in a smart contract do not
objectively display an intent to enter into the self-executing smart contract).
121. See id. at 341 (“Though they might not constitute promises per se, smart contracts are
voluntary mechanisms that purport to alter the rights and duties of the parties.”); Nick Szabo,
Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997),
https://firstmonday.org/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/LJ27-4NVH] (defining the
hallmark of contract formation as a “set of promises” agreed to in a mutual meeting of the
minds which smart contracts may not fulfill).
122. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 117, at 342 (writing that contracts require “overt
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basic example, assume an NFT vendor promises that upon payment of a certain
amount of ether, a purchaser will receive a given NFT. That is the contract. Assume
then that the purchaser received a different NFT through automated execution of
smart contract code. That is a breach of the contract. Contracts involve the creation
of reciprocal legal obligations, a promise for a promise, money for a good. It is
entirely possible to make a contract and then execute it automatically—we do every
time we buy gas with a credit card at a pump—but that does not make the mode of
automatic execution, or the code, the contract.123 Calling the “smart contract” the
contract would be like calling the truck that delivers the goods you order the contract.
The truck and the smart contract are not the contract; they merely execute the
contract.124 Contract law is about creating those binding promises.125 The technology
of executing those promises matters but doesn’t go to the heart of contract. The facile
analogy with contract law comes from the fact that it looks as though the coded
execution is enforcing deals that take the form of something-for-something.126
2. The Nascent NFT Literature
There is a developed legal literature on first-generation cryptocurrencies, which
focuses on finding the right legal characterization of blockchain-based activities and
assets. The overarching theme of that literature is that legal regulation of blockchain
depends not on the technology, but on how humans are using it.127 If the blockchain

acts of assent” in which “[p]arties must engage in some expression that displays a shared
understanding of the agreement, and a shared intent to bind themselves by its terms”); Surden,
supra note 117, at 631 (“Commercial contracts involve promises under specified terms and
conditions.”).
123. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 117, at 323 (observing that a vending machine
operates as a type of immediately executing contact because it “directly effectuates
performance by taking in money and dispensing products” and “incorporates enough security
to make the cost of breach (breaking into the machine) exceed the potential awards”).
124. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus [1864] 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (finding that no contract is
formed when both parties mutually misunderstand the meaning of a term of agreement).
125. See FRIED, supra note 118, at 17 (“But since a contract is first of all a promise, the
contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”).
126. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 117, at 356 (“First, one might suggest that smart
contracts, by making performance inevitable, are no longer promises at all. If so, smart
contracts would not reinforce the practice of promising. Whereas contract law supports
promising by giving promisors legal reasons to perform, smart contracts do away with the
need for reasons altogether, and fail to support the moral agency involved in promising.
Pragmatically, it may not be obvious why we should value promising, apart from the reliable
commitments that promising enables.”).
127. See Ethan D. Trotz, The Times They Are a Changin’: Surveying How the Howey Test
Applies to Various Cryptocurrencies, 11 ELON. L. REV. 201, 202 (2019) (detailing how the
“meteoric rise of cryptocurrencies presents significant uncertainties for both federal and state
regulators” who must adjust to enforce the legal regulation of blockchains based on how
people are using them); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Human Element: The Under‑Theorized and
Underutilized Component Vital to Fostering Blockchain Development, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
33, 33 (2019) [hereinafter Fairfield, Human Element] (“Let’s just call a spade a spade: people
are providing direct actual governance. The humans, again, are part of the technology. You
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is being used to transfer value, it is treated as a money substitute under the Bank
Secrecy Act.128 If a coin is issued to help raise money to start a business (a “security
coin”), it is treated by the SEC as a security,129 and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and IRS treat cryptocurrency tokens as commodities when they
are used as such,130 while privacy laws apply when a distributed ledger is used to
store and process personal information. The technology is largely the same, but
widely differing legal regulatory regimes apply based on the different ways people
use the technology.131
That use-drives-regulation approach has held as tokens create property
interests.132 If a token is sold as property, treated by humans as property, and passed

cannot separate them.”).
128. See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. TREASURY, FIN-2019-G001, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES (2019) (explaining how the Bank Secrecy Act does and may apply to “convertible
virtual currencies”); see also Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible
Virtual Currency or Digital, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,840, 84,840–41 (Dec. 23, 2020) (to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1022) (“FinCEN is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking to
seek public comments on a proposal to require banks and money service businesses (‘MSBs’)
to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers in relation to transactions
involving convertible virtual currency (‘CVC’) or digital assets with legal tender status (‘legal
tender digital assets’ or ‘LTDA’) held in unhosted wallets (as defined below), or held in wallets
hosted in a jurisdiction identified by FinCEN. FinCEN is proposing to adopt these
requirements pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (‘BSA’). To effectuate certain of these
proposed requirements, FinCEN proposes to prescribe by regulation that CVC and LTDA are
‘monetary instruments’ for purposes of the BSA.”); Trotz, supra note 127, at 210 (“The most
extensive guidance from the SEC on whether cryptocurrencies are securities is found in the
SEC's report on the DAO (‘The DAO Report’), where the SEC determined for the first time
that the issuance of a cryptocurrency constituted an unlawful securities offering.”).
129. See Trotz, supra note 127, at 205 (noting that cryptocurrencies can be used “as a
means of fundraising by handing out equity using digital tokens instead of traditional shares”).
130. See Allison Christians, Taxation in the Age of Smart Contracts: The CryptoKitty
Conundrum, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 91, 99 (2020) (describing the global response for how tax
authorities have regulated smart contracts and blockchains).
131. See Fairfield, Human Element, supra note 127, at 33–34 (noting that technological
innovation and regulation are inseparable from the human relationships and conduct which
determine how technology should be governed); Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 870
(observing that the “[w]ise regulation of trustless technologies will take note of the multiple
different use cases to which” people use and apply the technology).
132. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Property is a broad
concept that includes ‘every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or
disposition.’ We apply a three-part test to determine whether a property right exists: ‘First,
there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive
possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have established a legitimate claim
to exclusivity.’” (citations omitted)); see also Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 834–38
(describing the characterization of cryptocurrencies as property based on how people used
them); United States v. Petix, No. 15-CR-227A, 2016 WL 7017919, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
2016) (“Bitcoin operates as a medium of exchange like cash but does not issue from or enjoy
the protection of any sovereign; in fact, the whole point of Bitcoin is to escape any
entanglement with sovereign governments. . . . Like marbles, Beanie Babies™, or Pokémon™
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down through wills as property, law will begin to take it seriously as property.133 I
and others have argued for over a decade that when digital assets are treated by
owners as personal property, the law of personal property should apply; the same
goes for tokens that act as digital deeds for real estate, a solution that could end the
need for title searches and clear up confusion over ownership of land.134
The legal literature’s approach stands in stark distinction to the ways that cryptoevangelists have framed the legal debate. Much early activity around cryptocurrency
centered on eliminating middlemen, banks, and lawyers in particular.135 For example,
many bitcoin enthusiasts were drawn to the concept of a currency not regulated or
controlled by a bank or government.136 Law, then, was something that cryptoevangelists expected to wither away, with digital wallets replacing banks and
programs replacing contracts.137 This is a common theme among technologists, who
do not have a sense of the history of law.138 With the internet, government power was

trading cards, bitcoins have value exclusively to the extent that people at any given time choose
privately to assign them value.”); Parker F. Taylor, Vanessa A. Woods & Jack Tanenbaum,
(2019),
Estate
Planning
with
Cryptocurrency,
A.B.A.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/real_property_trust_estate/publications/probateproperty-magazine/2019/july-august/estate-planning-cryptocurrency/
[https://perma.cc/K5T2-3PKJ] (“Although cryptocurrency can be treated under various laws
like conventional fiat currency (i.e., cash), the IRS’s current position is to treat cryptocurrency
as property and not currency for tax purposes.”).
133. See Access to Digital Assets of Decedents, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
24,
2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/access-to-digital-assets-of-decedents.aspx [https://perma.cc/E8CZ-JKXH] (“[A]t
least 48 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted laws addressing access to email, social
media accounts, microblogging or other website accounts, or other electronically stored assets,
upon a person’s incapacity or death.”).
134. See, e.g., Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 20, at 827–28 (expressing how tokenized
“public ledgers offer new solutions to old property problems”).
135. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Demystifying the Blockchain, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/blockchain-technology.html
[https://perma.cc/K483-FRPW] (“If it is successful, blockchain technology will bring a new
level of enhanced trust to business and will also cut out the middlemen that have historically
tracked — and profited — from the complexity of so many different systems trying to
communicate with each other.”).
136. See Jon Martindale, Go Ahead, Pass Laws. They Can’t Kill Bitcoin, Even if They Try,
DIGITALTRENDS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/dont-worryabout-bitcoin-regulation-it-cant-be-stopped/ [https://perma.cc/V3UK-V7KE] (claiming that
bitcoin cannot be regulated).
137. See Jerry Brito, Foreword to PAUL ANNING, LORNA BRAZELL, MARK BRAILSFORD,
JERRY BRITO, MATTHEW J. CLEARY, JILLIAN FRIEDMAN, STUART HOEGNER, MICHAEL TAYLOR,
RYAN J. STRAUS & CHRISTOPH-NIKOLAUS VON UNRUH, THE LAW OF BITCOIN, at xiii, xiii
(Stuart Hoegner ed., 2015) (“A common misconception about Bitcoin is that it is not
regulated.”); Jerry Brito, Bitcoin Remains a Tool for Freedom, Even While Going Mainstream,
REASON (May 19, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://reason.com/archives/2014/05/19/bitcoin-remains-atool-for-freedom-even (arguing that bitcoin will likely tend toward centralization and
regulation). But see Martindale, supra note 136.
138. See Bratspies, supra note 40, at 8–9.
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supposed to wane.139 It did not.140 Copyright was purportedly dead with Napster.141
It was not.142 Virtual worlds were supposed to be free of real-world law.143 They were
not.144 And likewise, smart contracts will not replace contract law, nor will oracles
and code replace lawyers, judges, and juries. Providing strong legal analogies to what
has gone before serves to put property tokens in the right relation with the reasoning
of courts to date and gives courts a place to look when considering how to resolve
disputes involving litigants who use a new technology to act in entirely recognizable
ways (theft of a bitcoin is theft, for example).
Here, however, the literature diverges. The few extant legal analyses of NFTs
focus heavily on intellectual property.145 It is easy to see why: unchecked internet
copying poses an existential threat to IP rightsholders, and cryptoledgers provide a
way to stop copying, to allow artists to sell one copy of an artwork to one person, or
an author to sell one copy of a book to one reader. But if the technology is analyzed
primarily within the framework of intellectual property and contractual licensing
rather than the law of personal property, NFTs become copyright licensing with extra
steps. They lose the characteristics of ownership that interest vendors and purchasers.
A market for personal property that is governed predominantly by intellectual
property principles will not succeed. Just as with e-books and fully purchased
movies, collectors and investors will not truly own their intellectual-propertyentangled NFTs, and thus will not be willing to pay prices that reflect true ownership.
As NFTs enter the mainstream, they will be sold, invoking the law of sales of
goods. Indeed, some will be linked to and represent the sale of physical goods. They
will be used as collateral under the law of secured transactions, be inherited under
the law of wills, descent, and distribution, and so on. Each of these rely on a vital
characterization of the assets as, at essence, personal property rather than intellectual
property. To enable these foundational uses of property, NFTs must be firmly
grounded within a theory of property, and their primary legal characterization must
be that they are personal property. The following Sections begin to frame and then
embark on that task.
B. Sorting Property and Contract
NFTs provide the opportunity for a serious examination of the tangled legal
relationships online between property and contract, and between digital personal
property and intellectual property. This reexamination is long overdue.
Establishment of clear principles surrounding digital personal property—not
intellectual property—is necessary for NFTs to succeed. NFT buyers and sellers

139. See David. R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387 (1996) (“Even if we agree that new rules should
apply to online phenomena, questions remain about who sets the rules and how they are
enforced. We believe the Net can develop its own effective legal institutions.”).
140. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
141. See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. Id.
143. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Magic Circle, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 823 (2009).
144. Id.
145. See Evans, supra note 24; Clark & Burtsall, supra note 109, at 252.
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clearly intend to convey an ownership interest in digital personal property.146 The
law of online transactions has suffered badly from the lack of such anchoring
examples. Buyers of NFTs believe they are buying personal property, and sellers
claim they are selling it. The token itself is susceptible only to possession and control
by one entity, just like a physical object.147 The power of NFTs as a grounding
example for digital personal property cannot be overstated. Prior to NFTs, the best
example of digital personal property was a domain name.148 To see the shift in online
property law that NFTs represent, consider how much more convincing claims of
ownership over NFTs are than identical claims over assets won by a player in a nonNFT-based video game.149 Both assets consist of a database entry ascribing an
intellectual property resource to a particular account. Yet because the code is
immutable, because there is no centralized entity managing the blockchain after the
smart contract is set in motion, and because the user has the technologically assured
ability to use, exclude, pass on, or destroy the token without further interference from
the token creators, NFT claims for personal property status stand in a completely
different light than claims to standard video game assets. It is that difference that is
worth capturing. NFTs represent an important opportunity, therefore, to rebalance a
law of digital transactions that has nearly eliminated online personal property
interests entirely in favor of long-term control over assets by those who pretend to
have sold them.
The tangled expansion of intellectual property law in the first three decades of the
commercial internet has made the process of establishing clear and simple digital
personal property rights more complicated than need be.150 Sales law can simplify
the law surrounding transactions in digital personal property.151 NFT sales are billed
as the sale of a personal property interest, and that is precisely how the law should
treat them. Fully theorizing that simple statement takes some careful attention to the
evolution of law online.
The core question is how much control a seller may exercise over an immediate
or eventual buyer’s use of a fully bought-and-paid-for digital asset. Consider the

146. E.g., GODS UNCHAINED, https://godsunchained.com [https://perma.cc/YJL6-QKWF]
(stating that Gods Unchained gives the players true ownership of their items).
147. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Finally, registrants have
a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot
of land at the title office. It informs others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one
else’s.”).
148. See id. (finding that ownership of a domain name to a website is “exclusive” to the
registrant).
149. See Robert Farrington, Play-to-Earn Gaming is Driving NFT and Crypto Growth,
FORBES (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2021/12/13/play-toearn-gaming-is-driving-nft-and-crypto-growth/?sh=557d4418c2dc [perma.cc/KGN9-6SEU]
(describing shift to play-to-earn).
150. See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 57 (2016) [hereinafter PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, END OF
OWNERSHIP] (describing the confusing use of fine print in transactions); see also Aaron
Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1089–90 (2010) [hereinafter
Perzanowski, Fixing RAM] (describing how copyright law was driven by the need to address
confusion).
151. See infra Section III.A.1.
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following potential analogies. A buyer purchases a car and can paint it whatever color
she likes despite the former owner’s protests, even if she still owes money on the car.
But she could not do so if she merely leased the vehicle. Courts sometimes ask if a
legal interest is property or contract.152 Consider the question of whether social media
pages are property of the decedent, in which case they would be passed on to heirs,
or a mere contract between the platform and user, in which case they would not be.
But courts also routinely interpret scenarios in which there is both property and
contract. A contract to buy a car or a jug of milk or (I argue) an NFT falls into this
set of scenarios.
Even if a court determines that there is a contract to convey some property interest,
there are questions about the nature of the contract and the degree of control that the
seller retains over the asset in the buyer’s hands. Some contracts are immediate and
soon over. Consider buying a cup of coffee or a sandwich. The buyer and seller
exchange goods for payment and go their separate ways. There are no trailing
contractual obligations, no long-term control of one party over the other. Other types
of contracts impose long-term control. For example, a lessor can control what a lessee
does with the lessor’s property over the period of the lease. A licensor can control
what the licensee does with software during the entire period of the license.153 So in
selecting the relationship between property and contract online, courts must ask
whether the parties contemplated conveying a property interest, and if so, whether
the parties intended that contract as an immediate contract with little or no long-term
control, or a longer-term retained-control contract like a lease or a license.
The legal fate of NFTs depends on their characterization as property, and the
transaction as a sale. There is a lot at stake. When someone hacks an NFT smart
contract to steal the tokens—and someone will154—does the remedy sound in
property (replevin, conversion) or in contract (intentional interference with
contractual advantage or, in some cases, secondary copyright infringement or the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anticircumvention provisions)? When criminal
charges are brought, will they be for theft or unauthorized access of a protected
computing system—or both? When someone who owns NFTs dies, do those NFTs
pass to the decedent’s heirs as property?155 Or are they closer to social media
accounts, mere contracts between the decedent and a company?
My conclusion, below, will be that NFTs should be treated as full personal
property, that sales of NFTs should follow the law of sales of personal property, and

152. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2011)
(determining whether the distribution of compact discs for marketing purposes constituted a
transfer of ownership or a contract to promote the music contained on the disc).
153. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 44 (“As a non-owner, you cannot make
copies, even as a necessary part of using the product, without doing exactly as the licensor
demands.”).
154. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in
the World of Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-fromexperimental-cybercurrency-project.html [https://perma.cc/AQV6-AWLW] (describing the
DAO smart contract hack of June 18, 2016, which siphoned off 3.2 million ether).
155. See United States v. Petix, No. 15-CR-227A, 2016 WL 7017919, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2016) (characterizing bitcoin as property).
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that the sooner those legal metaphors are firmly ensconced in case law, the sooner
NFTs will reach their full potential as a way of satisfying the human need for digital
rareness.156 Treating NFTs as personal property will also begin to heal the
longstanding and growing infection of online spaces with overbroad intellectual
property licenses by providing a strong, clear counterexample for courts to build on
when differentiating between digital personal property and intellectual property.
We should regulate technologies according to how humans use them.157 Thus,
although NFTs are administered via a smart contract, the tokens are being promoted,
sold, collected, displayed, transferred, invested, and in general treated by humans as
personal property. When law selects a metaphor for a new technology, it works best
when it finds close analogies.158 Here, the law of personal property fits best with how
humans are using NFTs. No analogy is perfect. But finding the closest analogy and
learning from it can create, with some innovation, stable systems for understanding
how we ought to govern emerging technology.159 This works because humans run
our social system of cooperation on narrative, and humans don’t change that much.160
Stories that help us arrange how we live together (like the story of property—this is
mine, that is yours) capture our imagination.161 Strong stories also guide courts, as in
the discussion above about whether software is licensed or sold.
The growing field of non-fungible tokens and the electronic instructions that
accompany their governance, use, and transfer, will invoke the law and analogies of
property more than the law and analogies of contract or the law of licensing. When
parties convey non-fungible tokens that carry rights in specific property, subject to
control by a single owner who possesses the token, we are looking at something that
far more closely resembles personal property law arrangements than contract or
licensing ones. This stands in stark distinction to the momentum of internet law,
which has tended to upgrade the rights of corporations through their contracts and
licenses, and downgrade owners to mere users.162

156. See infra Part III.
157. See JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY: CAN LAW KEEP UP? 75 (2021)
[hereinafter FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY] (“But a successful rule does not give
credence to the technologist’s claims of what a technology ‘really’ is. What matters is how
humans use it.”).
158. Id. at 84.
159. See generally Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 782–
83 (stating that one advantage to analogical reasoning is creating a solid foundation of
understanding without requiring people to develop full, new theories).
160. YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS 28–32 (2015) (explaining how humans make up
stories to cooperate at large scale); see FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY, supra note 157,
at 18–20 (describing law as a narrative that can be updated to meet human needs).
161. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 11 (quoting cyberlaw expert Bryan Choi as
stating that “[p]roperty is an intuition. It is an emotion.”).
162. See id. at 26 (“Intellectual property has been twisted and stretched to create a system
of centralized and feudal command and control, rather than foster experimentation and
innovation.”).
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C. NFTs Face a Hostile Intellectual Property Landscape
NFTs face serious legal barriers to delivering on their promise, and the reason is
profoundly ironic. Law online is a matter of powerful contracts and similarly broad
intellectual property licenses, such that we do not truly own the devices we rely on,
or the digital purchases we access through them.163 We will explore the history of
this regime below, but the key point is that it was designed to address the problems
that NFTs were created to handle. Computers work by copying. The advent of the
internet drove the spread of copied intellectual property: Napster, YouTube, torrent
sites, and more. To manage this flood of illegal copying, law expanded contract rights
through End User License Agreements (EULAs) and intellectual property rights
through doctrines like the RAM-copy doctrine to give intellectual property holders
near total control over the assets that they license—not sell—to consumers.164
Licensing and streaming are the governing paradigms online. Online ownership has
become all but moribund.165
This is more poignant because the bulk of legal scholarship around NFTs centers
around the potential of the technology to help intellectual property creators—
artists—sell their work by selling single artworks or verified art within a limited
series, or as a way of helping musicians sell one copy to one customer.166 But the
scholarship to date has missed the point. The current online legal landscape actively
hinders the promise of NFT technology by making the promises of artists who truly
sell tokenized artwork not believable. To sell single, unique copies of digital assets,
we must permit owners to “reproduce” the work to the extent necessary to transfer it
to someone else (by making a copy and erasing the original, usually).167 We must
separate out that limited right from the traditional copyright—the power to make
infinite copies—that is retained by the author of the work. Given the law of the last
two decades and the way that networked computers work, that action is not possible
without more legal development.168
For example, when a person buys a Kindle eBook, they agree simply by opening
the app that they merely license the book; they do not own it.169 The counterintuitive
licensing rather than ownership of digital property has been the digital norm ever

163. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 150, at 123–25
(detailing how companies acquire power through online contracting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1.
166. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 24; Clark & Burtsall, supra note 109; Wilson, supra note
29.
167. See generally Sarah Reis, Toward a “Digital Transfer Doctrine”?: The First Sale
Doctrine in the Digital Era, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (2015) (arguing for an updated first sale
doctrine for digital items).
168. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(interpreting and applying the first sale doctrine toward a legal issue involving a copyright
question in the digital realm).
169. See Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=200771440 [https://perma.cc/FN4D-2SXM] (last updated
Mar. 15, 2016) (“Kindle Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.”).
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since a triad of cases from 1993 to 1995 created the RAM copy doctrine.170 Early and
highly controversial copyright decisions from the Ninth Circuit led to the current
state of affairs: whenever a person pulls up their e-book to read it, making a copy
from ROM into RAM, that act creates a copy that must be licensed.171 As a license,
the digital property can be subject to whatever terms and conditions the seller chooses
to impose on the so-called “buyer,” who is actually just a licensee. This is not true
for real-world property; you need no IP license to read a book you’ve bought because
you are not making a copy of it.172 The difference may seem technical, but it is, in
fact, profound. If a license agreement restricts you from doing a thing while using
the licensed intellectual property, you may not do that thing if the asset is digital,
whereas you may do the thing if the asset is physical. The one is a violation of an
intellectual property license (because you are doing something while making a copy
of the asset merely by using it on a digital device, you must follow the terms of the
license that gives you the right to make the copy), and the other is not.173 Thus, people
who own items in virtual worlds must follow license conditions in using items that
they have fully purchased and paid for, and can lose all of their property if they do
not.174 An owner of an Oculus Quest 2 who deletes her Facebook (and all of the
surveillance and targeted advertising that entails) loses her Oculus games.175
This is the very thing that NFTs seek to avoid. The value proposition of NFTs is
based on invoking offline narratives of free-and-clear ownership, in which the owner
can use, enjoy, display, and dispose of the property without any interference from
third parties. This stands in sharp contrast to the online intellectual property licensing
model, where the IP holder has the permanent power to dictate how the owner of a
given copy may use or dispose of it. Movies purchased from Google Play and eBooks
from Amazon are simply not owned. NFTs are intended to fix that, hence the opening
quote for this article drawn from the “NFT Bible”: “We have tons of digital stuff, we
just never really owned it.”176 But the difficulty is that even after the innovations
NFTs have to offer, there is little that has changed in the legal environment.
Without further development of strong legal analogies, ownership of a token
linked to a piece of intellectual property will not convey the same legal rights as

170. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993)
(supporting the conclusion that the loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a “copy”
under the Copyright Act); Advanced Comput. Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 364 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,
1334 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
171. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518–19; Advanced Comput. Servs. of Mich., Inc., 845 F.
Supp. at 364; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1334.
172. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 150, at 1–3 (outlining
the differences between analog and digital book ownership); see also Perzanowski, Fixing
RAM, supra note 150, at 1088 (defining the term copy as a “material object[] . . . in which a
work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated” (footnote omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)).
173. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518–19 (requiring users to follow license agreements
when making a copy from ROM to RAM); Advanced Comput. Servs. of Mich., Inc., 845 F.
Supp. at 364 (same); Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1334 (same).
174. See Gurwin, supra note 27.
175. Id.
176. See Finzer, supra note 1.
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ownership of a physical object in which intellectual property is embedded. NFT
companies attempt to resolve this problem through NFT licenses that grant certain
intellectual property rights to the owner of the token, but these licenses vary widely
and have constraints and restrictions that are entirely inconsistent with the kind of
ownership that NFT companies promote.
An example may help clarify the issue. Imagine that one purchases an NFT linked
to a piece of art on a digital marketplace. (It may help the reader to open a browser
to a marketplace like rarible.com to make these points clear.) With an exchange of
cryptocurrency paid to a smart contract that acts as a registry of who owns what, the
purchaser’s wallet receives a verified hash of a token that includes a pointer to a
metadata file describing the art, and a URL to the art itself.177 Practically speaking,
people talk as though the token and the art are the same thing, a single collectible,
but the truth is that the token may contain a hash of the art, a pointer to the art, or
both.178 For some forms of NFTs, the token merely refers to the art file, which is
stored separately.179 (You can see this for yourself by right clicking on a piece of art
on Rarible and noticing that you can save the image to your own computer.)
That the collectible consists of a token pointing to a work of art is not itself a
problem for treating ownership of the collectible under the law of personal rather
than intellectual property. After all, books and paintings have the same feature. But
because the art to which the NFT is linked is digital—creating something that is
digitally rare is the point, after all—the entire law of online copying applies. That
includes the reproduction right. The reproduction right is not such a large deal offline
for someone who wants to own just one thing. I am happy to own a book and not
copy it. But online, reading the book makes a copy of it from ROM into RAM.180 So
does every other action with it—transferring it away from me to someone else, for
example. As MP3 aftersales company ReDigi discovered when it was shut down by
a federal lawsuit, even if I pass a digital file to you by sending one packet to you at
a time and erasing that packet from my own hard drive so that there are never two
copies at any one time, a court will still find that an infringement under copyright
law.181
By way of comparison, consider the license conditions imposed by Axie Infinity.
Although Axie Infinity expressly sells buyers the axies (creatures) themselves on the
grounds that they are owned and may be resold for profit, the license conditions
imposed by Axie tell an entirely different story. The license notes that all graphics
(including those of the sold axies) are still owned by the company, and that the
company operates under the law of the Cayman Islands:
Unless otherwise indicated, the Site and the App and the Smart Contracts
are our proprietary property and all source code, database, functionality,

177. See id.
178. See NBA TOP SHOT, supra note 90 (separating the ownership interests in the token
and the art).
179. See Finzer, supra note 1.
180. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 217 (“Turning on a Kindle and reading a
Dan Brown novel should not involve copyright law.”).
181. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(deciding that the first sale doctrine would not apply in digital reproductions).
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software, website design, audio, video, text, photographs, and graphics
on the Site and the Apps (collectively, the “Content”) and trademarks,
service marks and logos contained therein (the “Marks”) are owned,
controlled by us or licensed to us, and are protected by copyright and
trademark laws and various other intellectual property rights and unfair
competition laws of the Cayman Islands, foreign jurisdiction and
international conventions.182
The all-important copyright, the right to make reproductions that is absolutely
necessary to convey a digital item from one person to another, is expressly retained
by Axie. There is no limited exception for transfer and, indeed, owners cannot exploit
their axies for commercial gain (which, under relevant internet law, emphatically
includes reselling a digital asset for a profit, as domain name cybersquatters learned
to their chagrin in the 1990s).183 The choice of law provision is so error riddled as to
be nearly incomprehensible, with the only emergent theme that users must vindicate
their rights in an inaccessible and alien legal environment—the Cayman Islands.184
The document limits the ability of any owner to make more than $10,000 in
merchandising from an axie without a licensing agreement,185 which both limits the
upside gain of the owner and directly contradicts the ban on commercial use
elsewhere in the license. Finally, Axie claims the right to collect a commission of
4.25% on all forward sales of an axie.186 The unmistakable impression left by the
Axie terms of use is that Axie wishes purchasers to buy and pay premium prices as
if they own axies but intends to claw back most of those promised ownership rights
through the terms of use. What the terms promised to the buyer give, the terms of
use take away, or would if the clawback were not so crudely done as to be likely
unenforceable. This cannot be the basis for a stable market in digital personal
property interests.
Such moves make the core claims of NFTs difficult to take seriously. Owners of
NFTs of course do not own the right to make infinite copies of the art for which their
token stands. But they have been ostensibly sold the right to act as if art that they did
purchase were truly owned by them. That includes displaying it, using it, and selling

182. See AXIE Terms of Use, supra note 56.
183. See id. (“[N]o Content or Marks may be copied, reproduced, aggregated, republished,
uploaded, posted, publicly displayed, encoded, translated, transmitted, distributed, sold,
licensed, or otherwise exploited for any commercial purpose whatsoever, without our express
prior written permission.”).
184. See id. (“This Terms of Use and your use of the Site, the App, and the Smart Contracts
are governed by and constructed in accordance with the laws of the Cayman Islands applicable
to agreements made and to be entirely performed in the Cayman Island, without regard to its
conflicts of law principles.”).
185. See id. (“An Axie NFT can be used to generate a maximum of $10,000 in revenue
before an official license agreement has to be signed. The revenue can come from either fanart
(tokenized or physical) or merchandise (t-shirts, mugs, hoodies, etc.).”).
186. See id. (“In addition to the Gas Fee, each time you utilize a Smart Contract to conduct
a transaction with another user via the App, you authorize us to collect a commission of 4.25%
of the total value of that transaction (each, a ‘Commission’). You acknowledge and agree that
the Commission will be transferred directly to us through the Ronin Network as a part of the
transaction.”).
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it. Those rights are free and clear offline. Ownership of an offline artwork entitles
the owner to display it on a museum wall or in the drawing room, because no copy
is being made. Online there is. Using a work offline involves no copyright at all.
Looking at a painting or opening a book involves no copy being made. Online it does.
Offline, selling something to someone else does invoke the copyright holder’s
distribution right, because of the “first sale” exception, limiting the copyright
holder’s power over distribution of the work to the first sale of that work. But offline
that “first sale” right does not apply to works licensed rather than sold, and we cannot
resell copies of software we purchase online, for example.187
This problem is readily found in the licenses accompanying purchases of NFTs.
For example, by license, purchasers of an NFT are often not permitted to
commercially benefit from their purchase or are limited in their ability to benefit to
a set dollar figure. The CryptoKitty “Nifty License” permits owners of a CryptoKitty
to use their kitty to promote their own merchandise, as long as they don’t make more
than $100,000 per year doing so, a startling limit for a transactional form that
expressly contemplates owners making money from what they own.188 The various
NFT licenses often permit an owner to display and sell copyrighted material linked
to the token, but licenses do not provide an exception to the reproduction right,
enabling those powers to actually be exercised without infringing copyright. The
SuperRare license permits the owner of a piece of digital art to display and sell a
piece of tokenized art but does not include exceptions to the duplication right, the
“copy” right, that would enable owners to do so with a digital artifact.189
These problems are not limited to intellectual property interests linked to an NFT
and conveyed by its transfer. For vendors who claim to convey ownership interests
to wipe out the middlemen, NFT creation and vending sites retain enormous power
over the context in which the NFT can be used. That power can and will be used to
limit purchasers’ power over their assets to levels far beyond, again, what an owner
of personal property would have. Consider, for example, the above-referenced game,
Gods Unchained, an NFT-based collectible trading card game that aggressively
promotes player ownership and resale of cards as part of its “play to earn” pitch.190

187. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
188. See Terms of Use, CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/terms-of-use
[https://perma.cc/BW6A-PGW7] (last updated Nov. 15, 2018) (stating an owner of a
CryptoKitty may license, copy, and display his or her own CryptoKitty for “purpose of
commercializing your own merchandise” so long as that Commercial Use “does not result in
you earning more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) in gross revenue each
year”).
189. See SuperRare Terms of Service, NOTION, https://www.notion.so/SuperRare-Termsof-Service-075a82773af34aab99dde323f5aa044e
[https://perma.cc/9FHK-XHU7] (last
updated Feb. 15, 2022) (“SuperRare items are unique, meaning that there should only ever be
one digital token for a given Work of Art. Artist hereby acknowledges, understands, and agrees
that Minting a Work on the Platform constitutes an express representation, warranty, and
covenant that the Artist has not, will not, and will not cause another to Mint, tokenize, or create
another cryptographic token representing a digital collectible for the same Work, excepting,
without limitation, the Artist’s ability to Mint, tokenize, or create a cryptographic token or
other digital asset representing a legal, economic, or other interest relating to any of the
exclusive rights belonging to the Artist under copyright law.” (emphasis in original)).
190. See GODS UNCHAINED, https://godsunchained.com [https://perma.cc/76AS-9B65]
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Cards in Gods Unchained consist of two elements: an NFT token which players can
transfer directly between one another, and the intellectual property of the card which
appears in the virtual tabletop.191 Cards are sold through a marketplace provided by
the game creator; cards are played within a virtual tabletop where the cards and card
art appear and the card stats take effect. In a system like that, the player owns the
token, but the game creator maintains control over what intellectual property can be
displayed in the game space.192 Indeed, if the creator of the game wanted to change
the value of the card (and to be clear, such creators make money by claiming that
they cannot change or take a token from an owner who buys it), they may do so by
simply changing the card’s art and attributes when it is played in the game space.
There is some hope for these issues. The analogy to physical personal property is
clear and compelling. Courts are used to hearing about how a person owns one part
of an asset, but merely benefits from a license in the other. For example, just as a
book owner owns the physical copy and the author still holds the copyright, an NFT
owner owns the token outright but merely benefits from a limited license in attached
art. Courts have said intellectual property is licensed (not sold) if the company says
the intellectual property is licensed.193 That leaves open the opposite conclusion, that
when a company intends to part with a digital copy, and says it sells an ownership
interest, it does so.
There is also for the first time a financial incentive for companies to get this right.
Until now, incentives for companies like Amazon have been to dance coyly around
the language of ownership, getting customers to pay premiums to “buy” access to
content that is in fact licensed. They are more likely to be disciplined in the market
for recapturing power through license agreements or control over the context in
which an asset is used. NFT creators have made promises that NFT purchasers are
the owners of the property, and those words have weight for courts. More, NFT
purchasers have clearly parted with enormous amounts of money on the grounds that
the token represents something different than merely the attached resources. A GIF
of LeBron James dunking is itself worthless. An NFT on Top Shot of LeBron James
dunking is worth over $230,000.194 The purchaser is clearly paying for the part of the
asset that they own, putting the transaction clearly outside of the mere licensing of
intellectual property.
III. A STABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL UNIQUENESS
Whether because of technological power retained by the NFT vendor (through
wrapping, pausing, code in the transfer functions, or similar moves) or law (through

(highlighting that the website is a “Play to Earn” platform).
191. See Frequently Asked Questions, GODS UNCHAINED, https://godsunchained.com/
learn/faq [https://perma.cc/K5SR-KD4G] (discussing how the cards recognize a unique kind
of ownership for the user).
192. See NBA TOP SHOT, supra note 90 (explaining that the user owns the token, but the
company owns the art).
193. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
194. NBA TOPSHOT, https://nbatopshot.com/transactions/top-sales [https://perma.cc/
7YT3-WAJF] (choose Top Sales) (reporting the highest sale of a Top Shot moment to be
$230,023 on August 25, 2021).
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license clawbacks and arbitration clauses), the legal framework surrounding NFTs
does not currently offer the kind of ownership interests that purchasers have been
promised. They are a bad buy. For NFTs to succeed, lawyers must pick better
analogies. I have argued throughout that the best legal characterization of an NFT
sale is as a sale of personal property. A key step notably absent from the literature is,
therefore, discussing how the actual law of sales of personal property, Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2: Sales, would apply. That statute has a range of shovelready applications, a rich tradition of consumer protection, and a deep bank of
caselaw. Courts also have a history of adapting its provisions to analogous
circumstances on the internet.195 The use of sales law over IP arrangements better
matches the expectations of NFT consumers and vendors. Aligning legal and
commercial expectations is what makes for well-run, efficient, and fair markets.
A further step is even more important. The intellectual property license is the
dominant legal paradigm for legal relationships between people and assets online.196
As we have seen, it is not the only available analogy, and in fact when it comes to
sales of non-fungible tokens, IP licenses are the wrong one. The development of an
alternative grounding example will help courts roll back the overextension of
intellectual property interests online. NFTs are unquestionably personal property.
Some of them relate to intellectual property interests, to be sure, but many do not,
and the conveyance of the interest is clearly in personal property terms. It is important
therefore to develop the legal theory around NFTs in order to provide a foundational
and grounding example of personal property online on which other analogies might
rest. A particularly valuable knock-on effect of establishing a strong legal narrative
surrounding NFTs will be to help pry internet legal theory away from doctrine and
analogies that have impeded its growth and development.197
A. Picking Robust Legal Analogies
1. Sales of NFTs
UCC Article 2 governs sales of goods, which are “all things . . . which are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”198 Courts adapt Article 2’s
provisions to new forms of sales. The Uniform Commercial Code notes that its
remedies “must be liberally administered,” and the Code as a whole must be
“liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,”
and thus “[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Code], the principles

195. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying
Article 2, Sales, to sales of software).
196. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1213–14 (2015) (explaining the dominance of IP
agreements online).
197. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 12, at 243 (“The solution is not just to move the
tool of intellectual property further away from the judge’s groping hand, but to nudge the tool
of traditional property closer. The solution is not just to pare back intellectual property
overreach, but to foster growth of old‑fashioned ownership interests in intangible property of
all sorts.”).
198. U.C.C. § 2‑105(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
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of law and equity . . . [and many other rights] supplement its provisions.”199 Courts
have long extended Article 2’s provisions to sales of digital assets and software,
particularly if the sale looks like a purchase of a physical object. For example, if you
purchase a computer or a video game in Best Buy, the purchase is governed by
Article 2, even though the underlying asset enjoyed by the purchaser is a software
license.200 Courts have routinely applied Article 2 to consumer purchases of
computer hardware loaded with software, or with software itself.201
Applying the framework of Article 2 Sales to NFT sales would have four salutary
effects. First, it would clarify the role of contract law in conveying the property
interest and clear up much of the confusion surrounding the unfortunate language of
smart contracts.202 Second, it would extend much-needed consumer protection
measures (including the powerful and flexible implied warranty of merchantability)
to NFT sales. Third, it would provide a strong analogy to help courts resist the
characterization of NFT sales as mere licenses, in which a purchaser who buys an
NFT in fact receives no more legal right in the asset than does someone who rents a
movie online. And finally, framing NFT sales within the law of sales of personal
property would offer buyers some protection from the unilateral imposition of
contract terms that strip them of most legal rights. The following Sections address
each in turn.
2. Clarifying Contract’s Role
One of the key problems with viewing NFTs as fundamentally creations of
contract and license is the overreach of licensing law online.203 Consider an NFT
linked to a piece of art. Courts could characterize the transfer of the NFT as merely
effecting a transfer of a nonexclusive license in the asset, or they could conclude that
the transaction was the sale of the asset, which includes certain owners’ exemptions
permitting the owner to display or sell the asset.204
Treating NFT sales under Article 2 would clarify the different domains in which
contract law and property law must operate in the sale of NFTs. A purchase of
personal property has two components: a contract to convey the property, and the

199. Id. §§ 1-305, 1‑103(a)–(b).
200. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that
under Article 2 of the UCC, a consumer who purchased a computer may be bound by terms
included with the product once the consumer has the opportunity to open the product and reject
the terms by returning the product); Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that under Article 2 of the UCC, terms inside a box of software bind consumers
who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by returning the
product).
201. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148–49; Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
202. See supra Section II.A.1.
203. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 150, at 174 (“But even
if courts insist on the license‑as‑contract framework, bringing contract law to its senses is
another way to chip away at the edges of the ownership problem.”).
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (establishing the owner’s right to sell and display an item that
includes intellectual property after its first sale).
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property interest itself.205 Conceptualizing the transaction as a contract for the sale
of personal property cabins contract law to its proper place.
The rules of contract formation under Article 2 are simple and powerful.206 Article
2 abolishes the requirement that offers and acceptances mirror each other, which
matters when buyer and seller are firing off various electronic messages and
embedding terms in purchasing algorithms, which is covered more below.207 A
contract under Article 2 does not need to be formed at a specific time, and any means
memorializing the contract will do.208 The terms of the contract are not set by one
party, but by merging and comparing the contractual terms proposed by both
parties.209 This flexibility pays off especially when contracts are formed by new
technological means and through conflicting legal assertions. Article 2 can find a
contract in the parties’ conduct, even if no contract writings are exchanged at all.210
UCC Article 2-204 permits contracts to be formed “in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such
a contract.”211 This in effect adds contractual protections to unspoken agreements.
For example, the purchase of a jug of milk in a supermarket results in a contract for
the sale of goods without a word spoken or written between supermarket and
customer. Similarly, in the event of an NFT sale, the actions of the parties will result
in a contract even if the parties exchange no other information. One party exchanges
cryptocurrency for the other party’s NFT: a contract has been formed.
3. Consumer Protection and Implied Warranties
Article 2 balances its powerful and flexible rules of contract formation with robust
consumer protections by investing the contracts it creates with implied warranties
that come with every contract and that assure buyers that the property they purchase
meets certain minimum standards.212 UCC Article 2 offers three warranties of note:
title, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose.213 Each would fit nicely
within the framework of reasonable promises made about an NFT: warranties of title
speak to the digital descent of the NFT and whether the actions of the seller caused
a cloud on title.214 This is particularly important because NFT transfers are not
reversible as a matter of technology. Once a transfer of a token has been hashed to
the blockchain, only the owner of the account that holds the token can further transfer

205. See Christina Mulligan, Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface, 93 IND. L.J.
1073, 1082 (2018) (noting that licensing permits courts to opportunistically characterize a
transaction as a contract or as property depending on the desired outcome).
206. U.C.C. § 2-204 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (“A contract for sale of goods
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”); see also id. §§ 2-206–2-207.
207. Id. § 2-207(1).
208. Id. § 2-204(2).
209. Id. § 2-207(3).
210. Id. §§ 2‑204(1), 2-206–2-207(3).
211. Id. § 2‑204(1).
212. Id. §§ 2‑314, 2‑315.
213. Id. §§ 2‑312, 2-314, 2-315.
214. See id. § 2‑312.
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it. If a cloud on title arises because of a fraudulently induced trade (or hack, or what
have you), a warranty of title gives downstream purchasers a cause of action against
the seller.215
Under UCC Article 2-314, sales by a merchant who regularly sells goods of a
given type come with an implied warranty of merchantability.216 That warranty states
that the good is of fair or average quality and will pass without objection in the
trade.217 So, for example, a sale of a car by a dealer would include an implied
warranty of merchantability that the car will be of average quality for a new car, if it
is new, or a used car, if it is used. The flexibility of the warranty is in its enforcement
of average quality.218 This warranty could be easily and effectively applied to NFT
sales. An implied warranty of merchantability would speak to whether the token
functions as intended—unlocks the smart car or transfers ownership and access to a
digital piece of art, book, CryptoKitty, and so forth. Tokens that do not function, do
not unlock assets, do not point to the artwork they purport to convey, and so on,
would not pass without objection in the trade, as the warranty of merchantability
requires. And the warranty of merchantability would only impose those obligations
on sellers who routinely sell such assets and thus would know their fair average
quality. Nonmerchant sellers could simply dispose of their assets without concern
for the warranty. The warranty would therefore act as an important counterbalance
to power and information asymmetry in the NFT market. Those who know and make
a living from the sale of NFTs would be held to the standard of the warranty, while
those who merely purchase the assets and sell them occasionally to someone else
would not.
The related UCC Article 2-315 implied warranty of fitness applies where a seller
is aware of the buyer’s particular requirements and that the buyer relies on the seller
to select the good.219 In such circumstances, there is an implied warranty made by
any seller that the object sold will be fit for that particular purpose.220 Again, the
warranty could provide significant protection to NFT buyers. Imagine a seller who
sells a hash to a buyer despite knowing that the hash is part of a fraudulent fork of a
blockchain, or that the hash has been wrapped in another smart contract such that the
collectible appears valuable but in fact is not recognized by anyone else.221 Even
where the seller is not a merchant, if she knows that the buyer has a given purpose
for the NFT and that the NFT is not fit for that purpose, she is liable to the buyer for
breach of the warranty.222 For example, a seller would be liable for breach of contract
for the sale of an NFT playing card in Gods Unchained if the seller knew that the
card had been paused in game and knew that the buyer was buying the card for use
in game.223

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
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To the extent that UCC provisions guaranteeing clean title and warranties impose
transaction costs, the underlying distributed ledger technology allows the
transactions to flow smoothly. The chain of title is secured to the blockchain and is
difficult to fake, making it easy to guarantee that there is no cloud on title and that
the vendor is selling what they promise to be selling. But there remain instances
where law must still secure title. For example, if fraudster F fraudulently induced
seller S to part with an NFT, and then F sold the NFT to buyer B, B’s rights in the
NFT as against S would be established by the UCC’s provisions on bona fide
purchasers, and B’s rights to sue F for breach of warranty of title would be secured
by the UCC’s warranty of title.224
4. Sales Versus License Characterizations
Using sales law to govern NFT transactions will further help courts avoid pure
license characterizations, which have plagued digital objects. Imagine if a bookstore
attempted to sell a book purely as a license. A court would still hold that the physical
book had been sold even if the intellectual property inside were licensed.225 The court
would not enforce license agreements for physical books that imposed terms of use
on the reader. The physicality of the book would keep courts from recognizing such
restrictive licensing agreements. The unique and non-fungible nature of tokens
should lead courts to treat NFTs in a similar fashion to how they treat physical books.
Sales law can help with this characterization.
The core question is what courts will do when NFT vendors and minters attempt
to claw back ownership interests they have sold by asserting terms hidden in Terms
of Use, End User License Agreements, or even legal language buried deep in the
NFT smart contracts themselves. That is, what will happen when NFT vendors act—
and they will—the same way that Kindle does with respect to true ownership of
digital property.226
The question courts will face is what kind of contract is involved.227 The key
feature of a license contract is that the rightsholder continues to exercise power over
the licensee, and, at the end of the contract duration, the licensee has nothing. The
key feature of a sales contract conveying a property interest is that once the sale is
concluded, the seller has no power over the buyer. Once the buyer pays and the seller
hands over the property, the deal is concluded.
This characterization is extremely significant for sales of NFTs. Recall that NFTs
are sold to purchasers on the premise that they may be resold and that upstream
sellers cannot interfere with downstream purchasers’ rights. At the same time, as

224. See U.C.C. §§ 2‑403, 2-312 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
225. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 196, at 1214–15 (noting the impact of
tangibility on court determinations of owner rights).
226. See Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (2017); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58
UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011) [hereinafter Perzanowski & Schultz, Digital Exhaustion].
227. See Mulligan, supra note 205, at 1075 (“Because EULAs appear to have
characteristics of contracts and of instruments that transfer property, lawyers, judges, and
legislators can unconsciously find themselves switching between intuitions that EULAs
should be treated as one or the other.”).
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above, the intellectual property licenses that accompany NFTs are much the same as
those which govern Google Play movies or Kindle eBooks. Getting the analogy right
is of paramount importance for NFTs to be able to do what they were sold to do: pass
freely in personal property aftermarkets for the profit and benefit of purchasers rather
than original sellers.
If courts consider the sale of an NFT to be analogous to the licensing of software,
the very sales rights that drive interest in NFTs will be imperiled. Consider the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Vernor v. AutoDesk, Inc.228 There, the question was whether a
buyer of software could resell that software despite shrinkwrap license conditions
that prohibited the buyer from resale. If the transaction were a true sale of the
software, the new owner would have been able to sell it forward to another user. If
the transaction were a license of software, the licensor could prevent the licensee
from transferring that license to anyone else. The court in Vernor found that the
characterization of the parties was dispositive, that calling the transaction a license
made it one. Thus, the court focused on
three considerations that we may use to determine whether a software
user is a licensee, rather than an owner of a copy. First, we consider
whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license.
Second, we consider whether the copyright owner significantly restricts
the user’s ability to transfer the software. Finally, we consider whether
the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions.229
Note what makes a “sale” of software a license rather than a sale230: the seller’s
characterization. If the seller says it is a license in a “license contract,” if the seller
claims to have limited the buyer’s rights in the software, and if the seller claims to
have limited transfer of the buyer’s transfer rights, a court drawing inspiration from
Vernor and similar cases will find that the transaction was in fact one in which the
seller granted the buyer a mere license. Thus, the seller could continue to exercise
control over what the buyer did with the software even after the copy was bought and
fully paid for.
Under the surface, Vernor’s arguments are quite unpersuasive. For example, if a
copy of software were truly sold, not licensed, then the seller would be unable to
enforce the purported transfer restrictions or use restrictions. The owner of software
would have the right to sell it regardless of the seller’s claims. So, the idea that a
court should characterize the transaction as a license rather than a sale, because the
seller attempted to impose transfer restrictions that would be invalid if it were a sale,
shows the court’s circular and rather inept analysis. And note, above, that a Vernor
analysis would gut the very purpose of the NFT sale, which is to transfer the right to
resell and profit from the rise in value of an NFT to the buyer, rather than retain it in
the hands of the seller.

228. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
229. Id. at 1110–11.
230. See Mulligan, supra note 205, at 1075 (noting that licensing permits courts to
opportunistically characterize a transaction as a contract or as property depending on the
desired outcome).
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But if the analogy is to sales of physical objects, a Vernor analysis becomes one
step more distant. A court would not hold that the sale of a book was a sale or a
license; it would determine that it was a sale and a license. The physical copy of the
book serves as an anchor to the court’s legal characterization of that part of the
transaction as a sale.231 In the same way, the token itself serves to anchor the
characterization of the transaction as a sale, even though it concerns an entirely
digital object.
There are compelling policy reasons to do so. People purchase NFTs with the
expectation of capturing the value of resale. NFT buyers expect—as do cryptoenthusiasts broadly—that the technological and legal framework will give them more
power vis-à-vis prior owners, middlemen, and other institutional actors, not less. Just
as the owner of bitcoin expects to be free of banks and financial regulators when she
pays the bitcoin to someone else, so the owner of an NFT expects to be free of
upstream owners, the creator of the NFT, and anyone else when she uses, displays,
or transfers the NFT to someone else. Thus, there is reason to believe that when
courts confront NFT sales, they will be less sanguine about imposing a structure that
purports to sell broad ownership to the buyer, but in fact claws back those interests
through provisions in contracts, website Terms of Use, or software End User License
Agreements. The economic reality of an NFT sale is that it is the sale of personal
property, not a lease, license, or other transaction designed to extend the control of
the vendor over the buyer through the asset.
5. The Battle of the Algorithms
Finally, analogies to sales law will help resolve a serious developing problem in
the sale of both cryptocurrencies and NFTs: a Battle of the Algorithms. Under the
law as it is, humans contract at a disadvantage with machines. Consider ordering
something from Amazon. If Amazon’s web server communicates contract terms to
you, you are bound by them when you click “buy now.” But if you were to
communicate terms back to Amazon’s web server, a court would most likely ignore
them, reasoning that the server was not programmed to accept what you had sent,
and no human saw the terms. The result of this power of machines to dictate contract
terms to humans is that almost every online contract contains an arbitration clause—
an agreement that the buyer gives up her right to go to court—and must instead
proceed to arbitration, where consumers rarely receive redress.
This problem is now being imported into sales of cryptocurrency and NFTs. A
framing example will help clarify. In Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., the Southern
District of Florida was asked to determine whether a buyer, who purchased
cryptocurrency by paying ether into a smart contract, was bound by the terms of an
arbitration agreement that appeared on the seller’s website.232 The court ruled that
since the buyer had purchased the cryptocurrency directly through the smart contract
rather than through the website, he was not bound by the website arbitration

231. See Perzanowski & Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, supra note 226, at 901 (“The benefits
of first sale have traditionally depended on a single trigger: ownership of a copy of a work.”).
232. See Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV, 2018 WL 4410110, at *12 (S.D.
Fla. June 14, 2018) (deciding that the arbitration agreement did not apply because there were
no buttons to click or boxes to check).
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agreement.233 Although the case and holding are straightforward, they raise a number
of interesting questions. First, it is almost certain that based on such holdings,
vendors will embed the terms of the contract, including arbitration provisions, within
the smart contract itself. It remains a question as to whether contract terms buried
that deeply will be enforced.234
A second means of solving this problem, and one that is uniquely enabled by
blockchain smart contracts, is that both buyer and seller may use a smart contract to
execute the purchase.235 We have already discussed a seller’s NFT smart contract,
programmed to accept cryptocurrency and vend an NFT to the buyer. A buyer can
do something similar. Consider a buyer’s smart contract, funded with ether, and
programmed to purchase an NFT once it reaches a given price. Such a contract might
watch prices through a site or service external to the blockchain (called an oracle)
and make the purchase when the price is right.
Imagine that two such smart contracts interact: one a purchase contract tied to a
cryptocurrency wallet set to buy NFTs at a set price, the other a smart contract set to
sell an NFT at a given price. Both can argue that the code is the contract; in fact, both
may have non-code legal terms as part of their agreement (things like “by transferring
cryptocurrency to this contract, you agree to the following terms and conditions”).
The key term on which buyer smart contracts and seller smart contracts are likely to
disagree is arbitration. Assume, then, that the buyer smart contract expressly banned
arbitration, and the seller contract attempted to impose it.
Such situations will increase in frequency, and the solution to the problem can be
found in sales law. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-207 provides for the
formation of enforcement of contracts where the offer differs from the acceptance.
The famed “Battle of the Forms” provision states that when both buyer and seller
proffer different sets of legal terms, yet act as though the contract were concluded,
the contract consists of the terms on which the writings of the parties agree and does
not include terms on which the writings of the parties disagree or, in most cases,
where one party is silent on a term.
The Battle of the Forms provides both practical and theoretical guidance for
dealing with algorithm-to-algorithm contracts. Algorithmic trading is now standard
in equities markets, both on the seller’s and the buyer’s side, so the prospect of
buyers’ and sellers’ contracts engaging in high-speed NFT transactions on more or
less the same grounds (that the NFT in question is expected to rise or fall in value) is
entirely predictable. When such cases start to emerge, the “last shot” rule will be a
bad rule of decision.

233. The idea that one loses all right to go to court by simply browsing a website is both
widely adopted law and rank nonsense, about which much ink has been spilled elsewhere. See
NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 33 (2019) (detailing the systematic
attempts of companies to deprive consumers of their right to go to court through mandatory
arbitration).
234. See generally Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 1033, 1055 (Mass. 2021)
(finding that the online contract did not manifest assent).
235. See Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 44–46 (2014) (arguing that consumer-proffered smart
contracts could counterbalance the power of mandatory agreements offered by sellers).

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 225

6/15/22 12:59 PM

1308

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1261

The mixture of wallet-enabled smart contracts and the Battle of the Forms will
protect NFT buyers from losing their legal rights when smart contracts both buy and
sell NFTs. Most important will be for buyer-side smart contracts to exclude
arbitration by express language. Where buyer and seller are merchants, it is possible
under UCC Article 2-207(2) that if one smart contract is silent on arbitration and the
other inserts the term, it is likely that a court will deem the arbitration agreement not
material and include it in the contract.236 Expressly excluding arbitration will cause
the terms to knock each other out, and the buyer will retain her right to go to court.
The same is true of warranty disclaimers. Assuming, as NFT contracts already do,
that sellers will attempt to disclaim all warranties and limit remedies, language in the
buyer’s smart contract reserving all warranties and preserving remedies will knock
out the disclaimers and limitations, preserving the buyer’s right to an effective
remedy.
B. The Need for Strong Personal Property Analogies
When we buy a car, we consider its resale value. An art buyer considers whether
the art will go up in value on resale. Students seek to resell their university texts, to
recoup a part of their investment. But when we try to create that same system online,
there are real problems. Consider ReDigi, a company that attempted to permit users
to sell their used MP3s.237 Users uploaded their MP3s to the ReDigi website, and the
original was deleted from their computer.238 Upon purchase, a user would download
the MP3, while the stored version was deleted as each packet was transferred.239 The
deletion method ensured that there were never two copies of the work at the same
time.240 While ingenious, the technological attempt to simulate rivalrousness and
uniqueness of a given copy failed to convince the court. In Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi Inc., the court determined that the transfer of the asset nevertheless created a
copy, even though the original was deleted.241 This copy then violated the
reproduction right of the IP rightsholder, and ReDigi was secondarily liable for
enabling the infringing conduct of its users.242 ReDigi shut down, and to date the
digital equivalent of a used record store does not exist.243
To reach this result, companies used carefully drafted license contracts to negate
the powers reserved to owners of property. For example, if I buy a physical copy of
a book, I may sell it at a secondhand bookstore, even if the owner of the copyright in
the book wishes to stop me.244 The drafters of the Copyright Act favored retaining

236. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
237. Capitol Recs., LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 641–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 655 (“[T]he first sale defense is limited to material items, like records, that
the copyright owner put into the stream of commerce. Here, ReDigi is not distributing such
material items; rather, it is distributing reproductions of the copyrighted code embedded in
new material objects.” (emphasis omitted)).
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 150, at 1–3.
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things like libraries and used bookstores, so that aftermarkets in consumer goods
could be protected against takeover from copyright holders. The key move was to
give a distribution right to owners. The copyright holder’s right to control who may
distribute a copy ends after the “first sale.”
But things did not turn out that way online. Courts conflated the digital
distribution right with the reproduction right. Computers transfer things by making
copies from one computer to another. She who controls the reproduction right
controls digital assets. And because courts consider even the most functional of
copies—say, the copy a computer loads from ROM into RAM—to be a copy under
the meaning of the act, the copyright holder is empowered to impose all kinds of
conditions on use that she could not impose had she sold a physical copy.245 For
example, where a condition requiring a user to stand on her head while reading a
physical book would not invoke any question of copyright, a license requiring a user
to stand on her head while reading an e-book would be. If the user does not do as the
license requires when using the e-reader, she is a copyright infringer. The computer
operates the product by making copies, as courts have interpreted things, and thus
any copies made must fall within the conditions of the license.
The ownership-elimination project has been so successful online that companies
now link online assets to offline ones in an attempt to seize the value of the
aftermarket.246 For example, my students’ law books now come with codes tied to
online versions of the book and other resources, in an attempt to reduce the resale
ability of law textbooks. And as any student can tell you, used books are a source of
huge savings.
The end result: ownership of consumer products online is weak and hazy, all
but gone. This is how Apple and Google want things to be. But now comes the
problem. What if one wanted to create an aftermarket in virtual property? What if,
like artists who sell paintings into a market that expects some paintings to appreciate
in value, the source of value to the original seller is enhanced by the fact that there is
a robust aftermarket in the asset? This is, after all, what cryptocurrencies do: they
aim to create a community of value. This is what initial coin offerings do. They seek
to create value by creating demand. The promise is that the rise in value in the tokens
will be captured by the owner of the token.
There is significant unmet market demand for digital personal property. That is,
for example, what bitcoin does: it thrives on aftermarket demand for bitcoin.247
Owners expect to capture any rise in their property’s value and to be able to sell the
property to the next purchaser. Thus, the initial purchase (the market) is less the point
than the later sales (the aftermarket). For many NFTs, the aftermarket is the entire

245. See supra notes 166–171 and accompanying text for discussion on RAM Copy
Doctrine.
246. For example, General Mills tied downloading coupons or using its online
communities to remove consumers’ right to sue for damages caused by eating its cereal. See
Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/general-mills-reverses-itself-onconsumers-right-to-sue.html/ [https://perma.cc/RVQ2-F7DF].
247. An aftermarket is the value an item has after it has been sold. When a person buys
bitcoin, she often hopes that it will rise in value, and that she can capture that value upon
resale.
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point. A buyer of a piece of art, trading card, or unique digital pet expects to be able
to profit from its rise in value.
The creator of the system has significant control over the asset because they are
able to ban or control access to the service or site in which the asset is used. For some
assets this restriction is lifted by license. For example, the license that controls the
intellectual property interests in CryptoKitties specifies that the owner of the token
may use the intellectual property associated with the CryptoKitty in any other site
that makes use of the tokens. So, while the CryptoKitties website itself is a game of
breeding CryptoKitties, perhaps another site or service creates a game of racing
CryptoKitties. In such circumstances, the ownership of the originating site or service
would have attenuated control because the token would still work in other systems
along with its attached IP. But in the vast run of NFT markets, control over the
application, site, or service in which the asset derives meaning can be easily
leveraged back into control over the asset itself. For example, the Terms of
Use/EULA that governs the use of axies (tokenized fantasy animals much like
CryptoKitties) expressly reserves the right to remove or ban players from the site or
service. That can also include changing the attributes on the axies, because the way
the site or service interprets the characteristics of the axies can change.
Purchasers of NFTs believe the hype: they have been told that they are the owners
of valuable, unique digital assets, and that they can capture the rise in value of these
assets as an owner would. But the structure of the markets in which NFTs are
appearing give the lie to that promise. The legal framework for aftermarkets should
depend on whether the market-maker is trying to sell buyers on the rise in value in
the aftermarket. The current legal regime has been shaped by two decades’ worth of
efforts to eliminate aftermarkets online. That effort has been too successful.
Consider, for example, the Axies terms of use listed above. Everything that is
promised by NFTs—purchaser ownership and robust aftermarkets—is taken back in
the terms of use and license agreement. The creator of the supposedly decentralized
and distributed system is actually profoundly centralized, requiring users to agree to
terms or be removed from the site, service, or even interaction with the ownership
smart contract, the very list of who owns what that determines ownership of the asset.
C. Grounding Examples
Courts need a grounding narrative to achieve stable aftermarkets for digital
personal property. Law proceeds by analogy, and technology law is no different.248
The claim that law cannot keep up with new technology is rank nonsense. When we
regulate technology, we regulate its use by humans, not the physics or electronics
behind the tech.249 A murder is the same, whether by axe, sword, rifle, or phaser. The
trick to updating law to keep up with technology is to find grounding examples; to
enable courts to say, for example, that the privacy protections enjoyed by snail mail
ought to be extended to email. The grounding example of a letter helps us get the law
of online privacy right.

248. See Sunstein, supra note 159, at 742 (arguing that law’s method of analogical
reasoning leads to correct results).
249. See FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY, supra note 157, at 75.
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Compare, though, the transition of contract online to the transition of personal
property online. Contracts jumped the digital divide effortlessly. A contract is
enforced similarly whether written on paper or stored electronically. Indeed, far from
saying that online contracts don’t work, courts enforce them with added vigor. But
digital personal property has not yet emerged. This is nothing sort of shocking, given
both the importance of property in the U.S. legal system and the public’s imagination,
and the meteoric rise in use and importance of digital assets.
As discussed above, what has been lacking is a grounding example, a clear win
for digital property, that establishes it above and beyond questions of intellectual
property. A grounding example means that courts will begin with the understanding
that an asset is digital personal property and then work outward to find the limits of
that interest and where it overlaps with or conflicts with intellectual property. By
contrast, courts now begin with the assumption that what is digital is intellectual
property, and then work outward from that conception. Personal property interests
(here, for example, consider to what degree you really own your smartphone) only
exist at the periphery, where licenses do not occupy the space. Starting from that
conception means that personal property interests in digital assets remain a
theoretical possibility, but never a legally embraced practical reality.
If they succeed, NFTs will play an important part in establishing digital personal
property. The analogy is too clear for courts to ignore. The NFT is sold with precisely
the rights of ownership—to use, exclude others from using, profit from resale, or
even destroy—that come attached to real-world ownership. Those representations to
buyers, along with the form of the transaction, the prices paid which reflect an
ownership premium, and the behavior of buyers and sellers after the NFT is sold, all
point toward personal property as the best legal characterization of NFTs. And once
established, NFTs themselves will ground further analogy. Courts and regulators are
increasingly determining that bitcoin is property.250 That example grounds the
treatment of tokens generally as personal property. NFTs, once they are firmly
characterized as digital personal property, will further strengthen the set of examples
of digital personal property.
In particular, NFTs will help introduce a concept of digital personal property—
like bitcoin—that can coexist alongside intellectual property interests.251 A personal
property interest in a digital asset must be particularly clear and distinct to avoid
being subordinated to intellectual property interests.252 In the offline context, the
physical copy served as the grounding component for the personal property interest,
as compared to an intangible intellectual property interest.253 When everything is

250. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (“For federal tax purposes, virtual
currency is treated as property.”).
251. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 196, at 1214 (“First, content owners,
particularly in the software industry, have endeavored to eliminate the personal property
interests of consumers, redefining the notion of ownership by characterizing their transactions
with consumers as licenses to use the works or the purchase of a license as opposed to the
purchase of a copy.”).
252. See Mulligan, supra note 205, at 1094 (noting how license characterizations can be
used to limit property powers such as transfer).
253. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 196, at 1214 (“[T]he tangible copy is rapidly
disappearing from copyright markets.”).
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digital, courts fail to grant a personal property interest in the copy that can stand
against interests granted in the copyright. They overlook the ownership of the copy
in their eagerness to discern the extent of copyright license.254
NFTs provide a case for establishing strong digital personal property interests.
The token is personal property. Whatever a court decides about the relationship
between the token and any related intellectual property, it cannot avoid the fact of
the token. The token grounds the property interest online just as the physical copy
grounds it offline. Something must be done with it, and courts will choose to treat it
as personal property.
The ramifications of having a grounding digital personal property interest that can
resist being absorbed in intellectual property licensing will be profound for digital
commerce. Many things already sold are more analogous to an NFT than they are to
pure intellectual property licenses, yet they are assigned to the latter characterization
by default. Digital property in games, Kindle eBooks, purchased movies and music,
fully bought-and-paid-for software are currently treated exclusively under the law of
intellectual property. But once courts widely acknowledge and enforce personal
property interests in non-fungible tokens, the analogies will cascade, opening courts
to a better understanding of what people own when they buy fully digital assets.
CONCLUSION
If NFTs had existed at the time of the internet’s founding, legal interests in
personal property would have translated as seamlessly as did contractual or
intellectual property interests. It took thirty years to create the technological basis for
unique digital personal property. In the meantime, intellectual property rightsholders
and platform controllers exerted stranglehold control over personal property
interests, squeezing them out in Terms of Use, End User License Agreements, and
other “I Agree” contracts.
NFTs are, therefore, far more than a niche technology supporting online
collectibles. They are a clear example of a purely digital interest sold as personal
property. NFTs contain a component, the token itself, that is conceptually distinct
from the abstract intellectual property rights. The token demands legal
characterization, and the obvious legal characterization is personal property. NFTs
therefore stand as a new and powerful grounding example of digital personal
property, one that is capable of resisting the dominant online narrative whereby
assets that are supposedly “sold” to consumers are in fact merely licensed.
That grounding example is particularly important because it connects courts to
robust and well-thought-out legal precedent. A sale of an NFT is a sale of personal
property—a good. Courts can therefore draw on the well-established and carefully
thought-over law of Article 2 Sales in determining rights surrounding NFTs. That
law either solves or suggests powerful and flexible solutions for issues currently
haunting NFTs: consumer protection, warranties, disclaimers, and, most importantly,
whether buyers of NFTs will have the legal right to go to court at all, or whether they
will be forced into arbitration under the law of the Cayman Islands, for example.

254. Id.
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NFTs lay the groundwork for fixing one of the oldest problems of the internet.
The internet threatened intellectual property because it is a technology that operates
by making infinite, cheap, identical copies. It took over two decades to develop a
technology that brought uniqueness back to the internet, by which digital assets were
no longer fully duplicatable with the click of a button. If NFT technology had been
available at the advent of the internet, law would have taken a vastly different arc,
and we would own our Kindle eBooks, Google movies, and digital art. It is time for
a late-breaking course correction. As NFTs join the small but growing stable of
digital personal property interests, the course of law will bend to follow, enabling
robust aftermarkets in digital property, lending based on digital assets as collateral,
and other means of building wealth for individual owners. The urge to own, invest
in, display, and resell unique items will drive a shift in not merely what we own, but
how we own online.
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